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NOTE

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2483rd MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 24 October 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2483)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   (*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
   (*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
   (*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

The meeting was called to order at 11.30 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
(*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
(*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
(*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representative of Senegal to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sarré (Senegal) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite Mr. Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2481st and 2482nd meetings, I invite the representatives of Angola, Botswana, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Wolde (Ethiopia), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. dos Santos (Mozambique), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mrs. Coronel de Rodriguez (Venezuela), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Kunda (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Algeria, the German Democratic Republic, Kenya, Kuwait, Mexico, Sri Lanka and Tunisia in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka) and Mr. Slim (Tunisia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 21 October from the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, which reads as follows:

> "I have the honour to request the Council to permit me, on behalf of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, to participate, under the provisions of rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, in the Council's consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia'."

7. On previous occasions, the Security Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connection with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In accordance with past practice, therefore, I propose that the Council extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*.

It was so decided.

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The first speaker is the representative of Nigeria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

9. Mr. FAFOWORA (Nigeria): First, I have much pleasure in extending to you, Sir, my delegation's warmest felicitations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of October. We also join the preceding speakers in expressing our deep gratitude to your predecessor for so skilfully and ably guiding the deliberations of the Council in September.

10. My delegation has read with great care and interest the report of the Secretary-General [*S/15943*] on his visit to South Africa and his contacts there. It was a courageous mission for which we are extremely grateful to him. The Secretary-General's visit, it may be recalled, was undertaken at the request of the Council in its resolution 532 (1983) which also required South Africa to make a firm commitment regarding its readiness to comply with Council resolution 435 (1978) on Namibia's independence.

11. But from the outset, even before he went to South Africa, it will be seen from the Secretary-General's report that the South African Government tried desperately to introduce extraneous and irrelevant issues to the primary question of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Nor was South Africa willing to give the necessary assurances regarding its firm commitment and readiness to comply with that resolution. Instead, representatives of the South African Government told the Secretary-General before his visit that South Africa only accepted resolutions 435 (1978) and 532 (1983) as the basis for further discussion, and that it was prepared, without prejudice to its position on other regional issues, to discuss the two remaining outstanding issues relating to the electoral system and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).

12. We are now informed by the Secretary-General that, during his consultations, agreement was reached with the South African Government on those two outstanding issues. Thus, the last remaining hurdles were cleared. But, in characteristic fashion, the South African Government now says that in spite of the resolution of all outstanding issues pertinent to resolution 435 (1978), further progress on the implementation of the Namibia independence plan on the basis of resolution 435 (1978) is no longer possible without the prior withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. It is South Africa's pre-condition which now makes it impossible for the Secretary-General to fulfil his mandate on the implementation of the Namibia independence plan.

13. Quite rightly, the Secretary-General promptly rejected the injection of this extraneous issue as not only outside the scope of his own mandate, but of resolution 435 (1978) as well. We are not surprised at South Africa's injection of a totally irrelevant issue into the resolution of the Namibian question. Year after year, South Africa has found one pretext or another for obstructing the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Since 1978 it has consistently reneged on its commitments. Its record on Namibia is one of broken promises. The plain truth is that South Africa never had, and does not now have, any intention of co-operating with the United Nations in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Any claim to the contrary is false and will not stand the test of South Africa's appalling record of broken promises on the Namibian question. After wringing concession after concession from all the parties concerned, including the Security Council, the racist régime of South Africa has simply asked for more concessions. First, it was the so-called impartiality of the United Nations; then South Africa later demanded the participation of the so-called internal parties; then it raised difficulties regarding the composition of UNTAG and the electoral system. Now, after agreement has been reached on all those issues, South Africa is demanding a further concession—this time, one that it knows is well outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978), and that it is not within the power of either the Council or the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to give.

14. The response of the Council to this arrogant demand should be swift and clear: it should be rejected outright as a further pretext to obstruct Namibia's independence. The demand represents a serious affront to the authority of the Council. It is time for the Council to call South Africa's bluff by invoking punitive measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Failure by the Council to act swiftly by telling South Africa that enough is enough will only encourage the racist régime of South Africa to persist in its intransigence.

15. I want to say, with all due sense of responsibility, that it is not simply the Government of South Africa that is on trial here today; it is the Security Council as well, for the people of Namibia and the entire international community are waiting impatiently to see whether the Council will now act decisively in defence of its own decisions and responsibilities. Namibia has remained on the agenda of the Council for nearly four decades, during which the people of Namibia have looked in vain for justice and for exercise of their inherent right to self-determination. Since the official revocation of its Mandate in 1966, South Africa has continued to maintain control over Namibia, in defiance of the people of Namibia, the United Nations, the Security Council, the International Court of Justice and world opinion. In that year, the United Nations assumed the responsibility of defending the rights and interests of Namibia and its people. Yet the United Nations has been unable to fulfil this responsibility, to apply the principle of self-determination to Namibia and to end South Africa's illegal occupation of the Territory.

16. Over the years, the United Nations has tried in various ways to get South Africa to accept a Namibia settlement plan through negotiations. But, using one pretext after the other, the racist régime has obstructed all such efforts to secure Namibia's independence by peaceful means. Council decisions and General Assembly resolutions on Namibia have been flouted flagrantly and with complete impunity by the racist régime. South Africa's open defiance of the decisions of the Council has inflicted serious and perhaps irreparable damage to the moral authority and prestige of this body. The persistent refusal of the Government of South Africa to respect the decisions of the Council is not a matter to be treated lightly, for it touches on the whole foundation of the United Nations as the primary instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security.

17. The story of Namibia is a tragedy not only for the people of Namibia but also for people of conscience throughout the world. It is the tragic story of a peaceful but proud people who have been subdued by force and subjected to institutionalized racism. It is the story of a racist colonial Power that has failed to live up to its trust and to accepted norms of international law and behaviour.

18. It is perhaps necessary to bring to the attention of the Council the magnitude of the suffering that racist South Africa's rule has inflicted on the Namibian people. The system of *apartheid* transplanted to Namibia not only represses the legitimate rights of the people to political participation, freedom from detention without trial and from summary execution, and their inherent right to participate fully in the life of their country; it also creates economic and social disparities which make the indigenous people of Namibia among the poorest in the world.

19. The story of Namibia therefore must focus on the legitimate rights of its people. It is not simply the tragic story of diplomatic manoeuvrings and protracted negotiations. Since the termination in 1966 of South Africa's legal control over Namibia, the Territory's future has presented a relatively clear question of self-determination for its one million people. Unfortunately, this rather clear objective has become entangled in a web of false solutions and extraneous issues, while the Namibian people continue to suffer terribly. Some 100,000 Namibians, or 10 per cent of the total population of the Territory, have been forced into exile by the brutal repression of the racist South African authorities.

20. What has the response of the Council been to South Africa's arrogant defiance of its authority? Every effort by the Council to act decisively against the racist régime of South Africa has been repeatedly blocked by some of its own members. In 1974, a resolution to expel South Africa from the United Nations for its failure to co-operate with the United Nations was defeated by the triple veto of some permanent members of the Council. The following year, a resolution for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa was again blocked by the same Powers. In 1976, another sanctions resolution was vetoed by the three Powers. The failure of the Council to act decisively has only served as an encouragement to South Africa in its persistent refusal to co-operate with the United Nations over Namibia. Persistent obstructions by some permanent members of the Council to the application of international pressure and sanctions against South Africa have strengthened the racist régime's resolve to pursue an internal settlement in Namibia, contrary to the provisions of Council resolution 435 (1978).

21. It is sometimes conveniently forgotten that resolution 435 (1978) was itself the result of intensive negotiations initiated by the Western contact group with South Africa, SWAPO and the front-line States. But since then, South Africa has proved only its commitment to avoiding implementation of that resolution at all costs while proceeding with its efforts to impose an internal solution.

22. In May 1978, the South African army and air force attacked a SWAPO refugee camp at Cassinga, in Angola, killing some 700 people, mostly women and children, and injuring another 1,500. That action was clearly intended to prevent SWAPO from accepting the settlement plan. But in July 1978, despite its reservations, SWAPO accepted the settlement plan. South Africa immediately raised new objections about the size of the military component of UNTAG, the powers of the United Nations police and the dates for the elections. In December 1978, despite the objections of the United Nations, South Africa held its internal elections in Namibia. Yet the failure of the Western initiative and the attempted internal solution still did not persuade the contact group to put pressure on South Africa through the imposition of sanctions. There was little or no response from the Western Five to South Africa's obstinacy. It was the crucial failure of the Western Five to contemplate sanctions seriously that encouraged South Africa in its delaying tactics. From that point on, they lost the only real leverage they had in getting South Africa to co-operate.

23. In the intervening period all collective efforts by the Council, the contact group, the front-line States and SWAPO, and, more recently, by the Secretary-General himself, to achieve an agreement on implementation of

resolution 435 (1978) have met with continued objections from South Africa. Yet even resolution 435 (1978) represented a major concession to South Africa by weakening most of the provisions of Council resolution 385 (1976), which first established the mechanism for the independence of Namibia. It was a significant departure in several important respects. None the less, South Africa demanded more concessions. Initially its objection was focused on the presence of SWAPO bases in neighbouring countries. A proposal for a 50-kilometre-wide demilitarized zone along Namibia's borders made by the late President Neto of Angola removed that particular obstacle temporarily. South Africa then demanded that the so-called internal parties in Namibia receive equal recognition and an active role in the negotiations. Next, South Africa demanded an end to all United Nations financial contributions to SWAPO and Namibia programmes.

24. Later, South Africa suggested that the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) bandits, being openly funded by South Africa, be included in the negotiating process. Throughout all these South African stalling tactics, the United States and some other members of the contact group defended their opposition to sanctions against Pretoria by arguing that its objections could be overcome through negotiations. However, it was usually SWAPO, and not South Africa, that made concessions on several of these issues, in hopes of actually moving forward on implementation. South Africa consistently found new issues to raise as obstacles to the settlement plan, until the pre-implementation meeting at Geneva, in January 1981, when South Africa, after assailing what it alleged to be the partiality of the United Nations, walked out, refusing to sign even a declaration of intent. South Africa's disgraceful performance at Geneva was not surprising to many who had rightly anticipated another dilatory tactic by Pretoria to impede Council resolution 435 (1978).

25. Since 1981 nothing positive has happened to give anyone a glimmer of hope that South Africa will ever co-operate with the United Nations without punitive measures being taken against it. In the intervening period, the contact group has sought to prod South Africa to move forward by accommodating it, through concession after concession. It is this new policy that has become known as "constructive engagement", which maintains erroneously that it would be far easier to exercise influence on South Africa to co-operate on Namibia by building a closer friendship with the white minority régime. This is the logic of the close amity between the United States and South Africa, a situation which has been denounced by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as an extremely dangerous development.

26. There is no longer any doubt or question about the abject failure of the policy of constructive engagement. It has done nothing to restrain South Africa. Rather, it has encouraged South Africa to be even more intransigent than ever before. In 1981, following the massive invasion of Angola by South Africa, the United States cast the only veto against a mild Council resolution condemning the invasion. It instead blamed SWAPO and Angola for the South African raid. The policy of constructive engagement is nothing more than a *de facto* alliance between the United States and South Africa. Other evidence of growing *rapprochement* between the two countries includes: expansion of United States military ties with South Africa; permission for South Africa to establish more consulates in the United States; changing of export controls to permit sales to South African military and police; and training of South African nuclear technicians at United States Government facilities.

27. The front-line States and Nigeria have worked in good faith with the contact group in the expectation and hope that their initiatives would continue to be balanced. But recent events have been most disappointing to us and call into serious question the utility of the contact group, for its uneven diplomacy is certainly detrimental to the attainment of a negotiated settlement in Namibia.

28. In the summer of 1982, formal negotiations between the contact group and the front-line States led to an agreement on virtually all outstanding issues. All that remained was for South Africa to choose between the two electoral systems. A letter was in fact prepared that would call on the Council to pass an enabling resolution to begin implementation. But that letter was never sent. Instead, we were confronted by a new demand, orchestrated by both the United States and South Africa, that implementation of resolution 435 (1978) could not begin unless the Cubans first withdrew from Angola—a demand that is now also being made to the Secretary-General by South Africa.

29. It is not necessary to identify the paternal origins of this gratuitous demand, as this does not alter its unacceptability. The Government of South Africa has simply embraced it as the most recent in a long list of objections to implementation. This issue of linkage or parallelism is neither part of resolution 435 (1978) nor within the mandate of either the contact group or the front-line States in negotiating the United Nations settlement plan. Angola has stated consistently that the Cuban forces would be withdrawn once Namibia became independent and the South African threat to its security was removed. On 4 February 1982, Angola and Cuba issued a joint communiqué that Cuban forces would withdraw as soon as South Africa withdrew its troops from Angola. The communiqué further recalled that the Cubans were first invited to Angola after South African troops and mercenaries invaded Angola. Underscoring Angola's security concerns was the third massive invasion in August 1982, deep into Angolan territory, by South African forces and the continued occupation of southern Angola by South Africa. Instead of meeting Angola's security concerns, a despicable attempt is being made by allies of the racist régime to portray Angola as the uncompromising party and an obstacle to Namibia's independence. They now seek to place on Luanda the responsibility for the failure to implement resolution 435 (1978), while seeking to legitimize the South African occupation of Angola.

30. The Cuban issue is simply a red herring to buy some more time for the racist South African régime. It is simply being proposed as a diplomatic curtain behind which

South Africa can hide to deflect international efforts to secure Namibia's independence. The Council must reject this gratuitious and arrogant demand as completely unjustified and extraneous to resolution 435 (1978). It must refuse to legitimize this objection, by actively contemplating sanctions against the racist régime in the event of its continued intransigence. The Council must prove its commitment to the independence of Namibia by finally and firmly rejecting the linkage with the withdrawal of Cuban forces.

31. In 1935, when Fascist Italy invaded Abyssinia, Emperor Haile Selassie's plea to the League of Nations for action was treated lightly. It was one of the events that led to the demise of the League and to the Second World War. Nearly half a century later, the Namibian people now make a similar plea to the Council for action against an aggressor. If it fails to act, it will have lost all its moral authority. It will be a tragic omission, the full consequences of which may not be foreseen today. The Council must not repeat the mistake of 1935.

32. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Algeria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

33. Mr. SAHNOUN (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, your accession to the presidency of the Council affords me the pleasure of addressing to the representative of a fraternal country the warmest congratulations of the Algerian delegation and to tell you, an experienced and able colleague, that I am convinced that you will guide the work of the Council in a calm and skilful manner. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana.

34. The impasse with respect to the question of Namibia that some insist on describing with a bitter feeling of impotence is not really an impasse at all. An impasse is a dead end. That is what South Africa, which has created that situation, would have us believe in order that it can perpetuate its domination over Namibia. The Secretary-General, to whom we express once again our appreciation for his unceasing efforts pursuant to the mandate entrusted to him by resolution 532 (1983), has correctly assigned responsibility in the conclusion to his report, in which he stated that "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*Ibid., para. 25.*]

35. The question, therefore, is how to compel South Africa to implement the United Nations plan. It will soon be nearly 20 years—it was in 1966, to be precise—since the General Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia. It will soon be nearly 10 years since the International Court of Justice declared South Africa's occupation of Namibia to be illegal.[1] It was exactly five years ago that the Council, this important United Nations body, adopted resolution 435 (1978) that clearly paved the way for the attainment of the objective hallowed by the consensus of nations, namely, the independence of Namibia in full sovereignty and complete territorial integrity.

36. The Secretary-General, on the one hand, and SWAPO, on the other, have diligently carried out the tasks assigned to them. The front-line countries have given the Secretary-General their support with the exemplary resolve to do everything in their power to assist the United Nations in carrying out its work of decolonization.

37. Only South Africa continues to put forward new pretexts to perpetuate its occupation of Namibia. First, there was a so-called partiality on the part of the United Nations; then there was an undesirable voting procedure. Today, there is a supposed linkage between the principle of Namibian independence and the attempted limiting of the rights and sovereignty of a neighbouring State. It would be utterly ridiculous were it not so serious. What is even more serious is that the representative of Pretoria stated, in this very chamber a few days ago, that the position of his Government was irrevocable and that it enjoyed support within the international community.

38. Drawing a lesson from the experience of two world wars, Arnold Toynbee wrote in 1950:

> "What the situation manifestly demands is a voluntary association of the peace-loving peoples of the world in sufficient force and cohesion to be unassailable by any who reject their pact of collective security or who break it".[2]

39. Indeed, that minimum cohesion is lacking, since South Africa is able to come here to defy our institution. Allowing the process of the decolonization of Namibia to be worked out through the distorting prism of East-West relations and permitting it to be viewed within the framework of conflicting power politics deals a severe blow to the collective effort towards Namibian independence that the community of nations has organized with faith, patience and perseverance.

40. Hence the enormous responsibilities before history that have been assumed by those who, by their role, their influence and their position in the contact group, have a particular duty to participate in collective action to see that in Namibia force may give way before legality and justice be meted out in the struggle for freedom.

41. This situation has fuelled Pretoria's intransigence and abetted it in its defiance. It furnishes it with reasons for persisting in its rejections and excesses. Clearly, the responsibility of linking the decolonization of a Territory, upon which the international community is in unanimous agreement, with the national sovereignty of another State is a heavy one. The establishment of such a linkage distorts all the enshrined and accepted facts with regard to the question of Namibia. It is a dangerous change of course. It is illegitimate, groundless and unnatural.

42. Have we forgotten or is there an attempt to conceal the fact that the real problem is the illegal occupation of Namibia by force, and that in order to continue that occu-

pation, on the one hand, and to subjugate African countries, on the other, South Africa itself brought war to neighbouring countries as soon as its ally, Portuguese colonialism, was forced to withdraw? Only a few weeks after the liberation of Angola, in October 1974, South African troops penetrated into Angolan territory and, on 11 November 1975, when the Central Committee of the Movemento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) proclaimed the creation of the People's Republic of Angola, the forces of Pretoria were in control of the whole of southern Angola up to the Lobito-Luena axis, in other words, several hundred kilometres north of the Namibian frontier. That was in fact what led the Security Council to take up the issue in March 1976 and, in its resolution 387 (1976), to demand unanimously that South Africa respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola and desist from using Namibia as a base for aggression against neighbouring countries. Furthermore, in the course of that same year, 1976, the Council was to meet on three occasions to condemn South Africa. It met in July again [*1944th to 1948th meetings*], following the fierce attack by the racist forces of Pretoria against the village of Sialola, 30 kilometres inside Zambia, which left 24 dead and 45 seriously wounded, once again, using Namibia as a base; and, finally, in December, following Pretoria's coercive actions against Lesotho [*1981st and 1982nd meetings*]. Not a single year elapsed, from 1976 to 1980, that the Council did not meet for the sole purpose of condemning acts of aggression perpetrated against Angola, calling for the cessation of such acts and for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola, and demanding compensation for all the damage caused. The South African raids have never stopped, and it will be recalled that, on 30 November 1981, a South African commando unit attacked the refinery at Luanda from the sea and, had it not been for the speedy action of the refinery workers, a terrible catastrophe for the people of Luanda would have ensued. Was that South African commando unit searching for Namibian refugees in the Luanda refinery as well? Such arguments no longer deceive anyone.

43. In fact, all of this is part of a vast plan aimed at destabilizing all the countries of the region. On 17 October last—on the eve of the convening of this series of meetings of the Council—more raids were carried out against Mozambican territory; and Lesotho is courageously confronting similar acts of aggression committed daily against it, in the face of the passivity and indifference of the international community.

44. The armed forces of the racist régime of Pretoria announced just a few days ago that powerful defoliants would be used along the border between occupied Namibia and Angola. Thus, while defoliants and chemicals are prohibited by international conventions, South Africa continues cynically to use them in areas that are inhabited by civilians. Given this situation, we can agree that the countries neighbouring on South Africa have every right to invoke Article 51 of the Charter, which stipulates, *inter alia*, that:

> "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

45. It is therefore up to the international community, and first and foremost the Council, to demand that South Africa put an end to these acts of aggression and to take the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. If South Africa can come here before the Council and claim support within the international community and defy the Council itself, it is because it has observed elsewhere, in another region, how, thanks to that same support, the archetype of that same expansionist policy could with impunity perpetuate illegal occupation and commit massacres and acts of destruction. We might therefore reflect on this further quotation from Arnold Toynbee:

> "Like other evils, War has an insidious way of appearing not intolerable until it has secured such a stranglehold upon the lives of its addicts that they no longer have the power to escape from its grip when its deadliness has become manifest."[3]

Racist militarism is well and truly doomed everywhere.

46. The preceding speaker, the representative of Nigeria, recalled how the various initiatives taken with a view to the adoption of sanctions against South Africa have failed because of the opposition of certain Powers that enjoy the right of veto. I shall not take up this point. I shall simply say that in Namibia a struggle for national liberation is being waged and strengthened; and it is bound to be successful, whether we like it or not. Elements foreign to the Namibian national liberation struggle are being introduced. That struggle is ours and, in the first place, that of the Council, which has proclaimed Namibia's right to independence and defined the modalities through which it should enjoy that right in an accepted framework of resolutions and decisions. The Council must work towards the unalterable implementation of those resolutions and decisions. Let the Council speak clearly of legality, the conditions of its reinstatement and, above all, the means to restore it.

47. In this wide-ranging action, the Council plays an essential part. Its resolutions are too often ignored, its authority too often defied and its role as the primary guarantor of international peace and security yet to be assumed, and, if this continues, the Council runs the risk of losing its credibility and its greatness.

48. In Namibia, it is the very *raison d'être* of the Council that is at stake. The Charter has provided the Council with every measure that should be taken against Pretoria in order to restore legality and to have the rule of law triumph in Namibia.

49. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial

Countries and Peoples, Mr. Abdul G. Koroma. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

50. Mr. KOROMA: On behalf of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, I wish to express my appreciation for this opportunity to address the Council in connection with its consideration of the critical situation with which the Organization is confronted in respect of Namibia.

51. For the second time in five months the Council is meeting specifically to consider the question of Namibia. This series of meetings of the Council, however, comes at a moment of deep crisis. This is so, not only because the efforts of the international community to bring about genuine independence for Namibia by peaceful means have been at a standstill owing to the intransigence of the aggressive minority régime in Pretoria but also because of the deteriorating international situation in southern Africa brought about by the repeated armed attacks, acts of aggression and destabilization by the South African racist régime against the neighbouring independent African States. This policy of aggression obviously entails the potential for a wider conflict in the area with indeterminable consequences.

52. In Namibia today there is open military conflict and repression. South Africa's illegal occupation is maintained only with the aid of tens of thousands of South African troops. The Council cannot ignore this serious threat to international peace and security in the region; nor can we—except at our own peril—continue to remain inactive in the face of so much injustice and human suffering. We must be equally mindful of the fact that the open defiance by South Africa of the will of the international community is a damaging affront to the Organization, since it calls into question the very principles on which the United Nations was founded.

53 Guided by its mandate to ensure that the peoples of colonial Territories and countries are enabled to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, the Special Committee has given high priority to the important question of the decolonization of Namibia. In a decision adopted at its 1248th meeting, on 13 October,[4] the Special Committee condemned South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia, its brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with the related resolutions and decisions of the United Nations.

54. The Committee deprecated any attempt to undermine the international consensus embodied in Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and other relevant United Nations resolutions, which constitute the acceptable basis for a peaceful transition of Namibia to independence, and it rejected the persistent attempts by the United States of America and South Africa to establish any linkage or parallelism between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban internationalist forces from Angola. The Committee emphasized unequivocally that the persistence of such attempts would only retard the decolonization process in Namibia and constitute interference in the internal affairs of Angola.

55. In condemning the repeated acts of aggression perpetrated by the South African racist minority régime in Pretoria against sovereign neighbouring States, the Special Committee recommended that the Security Council, in the light of the serious threat to international peace and security posed by South Africa's actions, respond positively to the overwhelming demand of the international community by imposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions against that country, under the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

56. That, in brief, is the principled position of the Special Committee with regard to this all-important matter of Namibia. South Africa's continued defiance of the will of the international community, as exemplified by the recent blatant breach of international law against sovereign independent Mozambique, underscores the validity of that position of the Committee, which is based on its conviction that the United Nations is duty-bound to do everything possible to terminate South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. Indeed, all that has happened during the five years since the Council unanimously adopted resolution 435 (1978) reveals a consistent and calculated policy of dissembling and delay—indeed, a policy of fraud. All of these manoeuvres have, clearly unmasked the true intent of the Government of South Africa. This has been, under the guise of negotiations, to earn time to consolidate its domination over the Territory through the proxy of a puppet régime and to deny the Namibian people their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. South Africa's attitude throughout has been characterized by inflexibility and confrontation, by broken promises, false assurances and outright duplicity. The developments since 1978 are ample proof that South Africa is not prepared willingly—I repeat, willingly—to accord the Namibian people their right to genuine freedom and independence.

57. Throughout the ensuing negotiations, the leadership of SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia, has conducted itself with outstanding statesmanship and dignity as clearly demonstrated in its sincere willingness and steadfast commitment to effect the full and speedy implementation of the United Nations plan. The Special Committee pays a warm tribute to the SWAPO leadership for its manifest spirit of accommodation, patience and responsiveness. In the same context, the Special Committee pays a particular tribute to the leaders of the front-line States for the crucial role they have played throughout, in support of the cause of the people of Namibia.

58. In his report, which is before the Council, the Secretary-General states that his recent consultations "have resulted, as far as UNTAG is concerned, in resolving virtually all the outstanding issues", and concludes that: "In fact, we have never before been so close to finality

on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." [*See S/15943, para. 24.*] In expressing the Special Committee's appreciation of his tireless endeavours, I wish to express our confident hope that the Secretary-General will now be able to move forward with dispatch with a view to the full implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978) and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with respect to the international Territory of Namibia.

59. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, Mr. Uddhav Deo Bhatt, to whom the Council extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

60. Mr. BHATT: Since its inception in 1963, the Special Committee against *Apartheid* has been dealing with the question of *apartheid* in South Africa and the ramifications in the region of that country's racial policies. The Council itself has been seized of this problem since 1960. Since 1966, when the General Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia, both the Council and the Assembly have adopted numerous resolutions declaring South Africa's presence in Namibia to be illegal and calling on it to withdraw.

61. Ignoring all these resolutions, including Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), which provide for general elections and self-determination for the Namibian people, the South African régime has continued its illegal occupation of the Territory and prevented the United Nations from carrying out its responsibilities in this regard.

62. As is well known, the Secretary-General held discussions last August in Cape Town with the South African régime, only to find that the racist minority régime had come up with further excuses to protract consultations and deny self-determination to the Namibian people. The *apartheid* régime now demands the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978), which that régime itself had accepted.

63. Regrettably, the South African régime finds support for its new extraneous demand in the so-called linkage, parallelism and "constructive engagement" policies of the United States. The rest of the world has expressed dismay at this so-called linkage that makes the Territory's independence a captive of the strategic and economic interests or demands of a couple of countries.

64. Earlier this year, the Special Committee conducted a fact-finding mission in southern Africa, where it verified that South Africa's acts of aggression and other efforts at destabilization in the region had shown a marked increase in the last few years. Only last week, South Africa attacked the office of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) in Mozambique, causing a number of deaths and injuries. And only about 10 days ago it displayed its military might in a huge military parade at Pretoria. Recently, it has expanded the export of its military hardware as well as its military call-up system. It has strongly militarized white South African society.

65. Moreover, South Africa has recently opened a new road in the northern part of the country near the borders of Zimbabwe and Botwswana for military use. The road can also be used as a landing strip for military aircraft, and it is reported that similar road/airstrips are scheduled for other parts of the country.

66. In Namibia, about 50 military bases and over 100,000 South African and South African-controlled troops are used to suppress the freedom struggle and to commit acts of aggression against Angola and Zambia. In fact, a large part of Angolan territory is under South Africa's occupation. Also, according to recent reports, soldiers and police in Namibia have commited untold atrocities against the civilian population.

67. Recently, South Africa has brutally oppressed Lesotho and caused much hardship to its citizens and economy. It demanded that Lesotho return South African refugees on the alleged grounds that they posed a security threat to South Africa; Lesotho was obliged to appeal to the United Nations and international community to persuade South Africa to desist from such inhuman demands.

68. While in Namibia the South African régime intends to impose an "internal settlement" through a so-called Council of State, in total disregard of the United Nations and world opinion, in South Africa it is fomenting civil strife through constitutional changes propagated as constitutional reforms. These sham reforms, which have been passed by the unrepresentative Parliament, are going to be the subject of a referendum to be held on 2 November next, that is, in about 10 days, among whites alone.

69. Briefly, the constitutional changes propose to give limited representation to Coloureds and Indians in a racially segregated Parliament, with the exclusion of the Africans, who constitute 72 per cent of the country's population. Basically, it is designed to entrench racial discrimination in the Constitution, to preserve white minority rule and to perpetuate *apartheid*.

70. It does not seem that the South African régime intends to eliminate *apartheid* or to withdraw from Namibia peacefully. On the contrary, that régime seems bent on military solutions to preserve white minority rule both in South Africa and in Namibia. Even political decision-making at the highest level in South Africa has of late been greatly militarized. Indeed, several recent studies have concluded that military considerations have become central in political decision-making and that it is the inner cabinet, composed of military men close to the Prime Minister, that makes political decisions, rather than the Cabinet of Ministers. Faced with a growing crisis at home, the *apartheid* régime is trying to extend the conflict to the whole region.

71. No doubt the situation created by South Africa in the region is a threat to, and even a constant breach of, international peace and security. Because self-determination and decolonization in Namibia and peaceful transition to

majority rule in South Africa are obstructed by the intransigent South African régime, which has lost all legitimacy, the United Nations has no alternative but to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions on that defiant and illegitimate régime. Earlier this year, the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence adopted the Paris Declaration on Namibia and a Programme of Action on Namibia.[5] The Special Committee against *Apartheid* is convinced that the Declaration and Programme of Action should be implemented without delay.

72. Therefore we strongly urge the Council to reject the so-called linkage or parallelism, to impose comprehensive sanctions on South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter and to strengthen the existing arms embargo in order to compel South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and to establish majority rule in South Africa itself.

73. The Special Committee firmly rejects all manoeuvres and attempts to defer the independence of Namibia. In its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session and to the Security Council, it states, *inter alia*:

> "The persistent attempts by the United States and South Africa to establish the so-called linkage or parallelism between the independence of Namibia and extraneous issues, in particular the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, represent little respect for the resolutions of the Security Council. The so-called linkage or parallelism was resolutely rejected by the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and various United Nations organs, including the General Assembly itself, and was qualified as an attempt to retard the decolonization process in Namibia and as interference in the internal affairs of Angola."[6]

74. While pledging the Special Committee's solidarity with the heroic and struggling people of Namibia and their national liberation movement, SWAPO, I congratulate the United Nations Council for Namibia, the legal Administering Authority for Namibia, on its tireless efforts towards achieving the independence and freedom of Namibia and its people.

75. Mr. UMBA di LUTETE (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, first of all it is my pleasant duty to extend to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of October. Many previous speakers have emphasized your wealth of experience as a diplomat, your probity and your skill, which augur well for the success of our work. My delegation willingly associates itself with that appreciation and wishes you every success in your important and delicate task.

76. I should like to take this opportunity to pay a well-deserved tribute to Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, who so competently and efficiently conducted the proceedings of the Council during the month of September, which was a rather difficult month.

77. It was in May this year that the members of the Council unanimously adopted resolution 532 (1983). After reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and repeating that resolution 435 (1978) remained the sole basis for a settlement of the Namibian problem, the resolution called upon South Africa to co-operate with the Secretary-General to expedite the independence of Namibia. To mark the urgency and the particular interest the Council attaches to a solution of the Namibian problem, it called upon the Secretary-General to report to it on the situation not later than 31 August 1983.

78. My delegation would like, in passing, to pay a well-deserved tribute to the Secretary-General for the manner in which he carried out his task on this occasion. He did not confine himself to establishing contacts from his office on the 38th floor. He went to the lion's den in person, both in Pretoria and in Namibia. Furthermore, as a subtle diplomat and a faithful servant of the United Nations, he was able to avoid the traps that South Africa set for him, trying to induce him to stray from the terms of his mandate.

79. As was the case in May, the report he has submitted to us deserves praise because of its clarity, its conciseness and its impartiality—so much so that South Africa, a country which over the years has constantly accused the United Nations of partiality and partisanship, was unable to find fault with it.

80. After the adoption of resolution 532 (1983), the African and non-aligned members of the Council, and with them the vast majority of peace-loving and freedom-loving people, entertained the hope that, this time at least, South Africa might heed the message of history and the voice of reason. In other words, they hoped, without really believing it, that South Africa would be able to implement resolution 435 (1978) without too much procrastination. This proved to be only one further illusion.

81. Of course, South Africa did declare that all the problems had been resolved and that it would henceforth no longer oppose the independence of Namibia. However, that assertion was soon contradicted by South Africa making it conditional on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

82. One does not have to be very clever to realize that that was nothing but a pretext. Indeed, as has so often been stressed, the Cuban presence in Angola is an issue that has nothing whatsoever to do with resolution 435 (1978). What is more, the Cuban troops are in Angola, a sovereign country, at the request of the authorities of that country. Furthermore, the Cuban troops are not in occupation of either Namibia or South Africa. On the contrary, it is South Africa which has continually committed aggression against Angola and is occupying its territory. Also, as the representatives of Angola and the United Republic of Tanzania stated, the first attacks by South Africa against Angola began well before the arrival in Angola of Cuban troops. Similarly, when South Africa committed aggression against Lesotho, it was not to fight Cuban troops on its soil.

83. However that may be, if we still have any illusions about the true intentions of South Africa, the most recent statement of its representative, on 20 October [*2481st meeting*], before the Council, would serve to dispel them. We witnessed the same intransigence, the same arrogance, the same threats, the same defiance, the same lack of moderation. According to South Africa, any statement that does not fall within the terms of its diktat is irresponsible.

84. In the course of the Council debate in May on the same subject, as we recall, South Africa all but said, in effect, that all the members of the Security Council, in fact all the Members of the United Nations, were rogues.

85. Finally, with everything that we know, I affirm, for my part, that by dealing with South Africa as we are doing, we are wasting our time, for we do not speak the same language and therefore, obviously, we cannot possibly understand each other.

86. The proof of this is, first, that when the United Nations affirmed that the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia no longer existed, South Africa claimed, on the contrary, that it still enjoyed all rights over that Territory, that it did not recognize the term "decolonization" and that, in any case, the United Nations did not count in its opinion. It was only the contact group which had any importance for it.

87. Secondly, when we assert that South Africa was wrong not to grant independence to Namibia, South Africa shamelessly proclaims in the Council that it is not isolated and that, as a matter of fact, it is supported in this by friends.

88. Thirdly, as far as the United Nations is concerned, SWAPO is the sole representative of the Namibian people, while South Africa claims that SWAPO is a terrorist organization.

89. Fourthly, South Africa, furthermore, claims that it has the right to identify and destroy all those who, in independent African countries, issue hostile propaganda against it.

90. According to this logic, South Africa, which has proclaimed its hostility to certain Powers, should also therefore be attacked by those Powers for reasons of self-defence.

91. But ultimately, who is the true terrorist here? Is it not South Africa, which is occupying without any legal title thereto a Territory that does not belong to it? Who is acting in self-defence? Surely, it is the martyred people of Namibia, terrorized by a country which knows neither morality nor law.

92. In the view of my delegation, the present way of dealing with the Namibian problem is wrong and even contains an element of contradiction on our own part, because the position of South Africa in Namibia is like that of a thief, a usurper, a taker of hostages, at bay. Nothing can come of negotiations now. It is perhaps understandable that poor, nearly defenceless States such as ours should be defied by South Africa; what is incomprehensible is that so many Powers—indeed super-Powers—represented here in the Council, can continue to swallow such an affront. Even those who continue to support South Africa in its madness should drop an ally that is so embarrasing and can only compromise them.

93. First of all, however, to avoid any confusion, it is urgent for the Council to reject categorically any attempt to link the independence of Namibia with the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. If we follow the present course, there is nothing to prevent South Africa tomorrow from asking African States or the United Nations not to recognize SWAPO or ANC any longer—or simply to stop breathing.

94. Since South Africa believes in and defers only to the contact group, which promised to convince the Pretoria authorities, the member countries of the group have thus lost face. But we are sure, nevertheless, that the members of the contact group are jealous of their honour and their credibility, which has been so profoundly besmirched by the bad faith of their ally, which has exposed them.

95. The Council should call South Africa and the contact group to account. Indeed, we should be tempted to appeal for the enactment of coercive enforcement measures as laid down in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, were the Security Council not divided. Alas, however, it has neither the boldness nor the clear-sightedness nor the courage, to condemn acts of aggression, acts of force or even violations of the norms of law, so, if we did make such an appeal, we should only be indulging in wishful thinking to suppose a resolution of that sort could be adopted.

96. Let us not forget that all the victims of the wars in the Middle East, Lebanon, Chad, Afghanistan, Namibia, South-East Asia and Angola, as well as those who lost their lives aboard the South Korean Boeing air liner, are members of our human race.

97. Who is to blame? All of us here in the Council, in a sense. I am not answering the question myself, but I should like to put this question to all the members here. What is sure is that the Council must also shoulder its responsibilities if it wants to retain a scrap of credibility.

98. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Kenya. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

99. Mr. WABUGE (Kenya): Mr. President, I should like, first of all, to express my thanks to you and to the other members of the Council for giving our delegation the opportunity to participate in this important debate on the question of Namibia.

100. Secondly, Sir, I wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the hight office of President of the Council

for the month of October. We have no doubt that under your guidance, coupled with your diplomatic skill, this debate will be led to a successful conclusion, making significant steps towards the independence of Namibia. I should also like to take this opportunity to pay a tribute, through you, Mr. President, to your predecessor Mr. Noel Sinclair.

101. This is the second time we are meeting this year on the question of Namibia. In May of this year, the Council once again took up the issue of Namibia [*2439th to 2444th and 2446th to 2451st meetings*]. The Council then adopted resolution 532 (1983), in which it condemned South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and mandated the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire, with a view to securing the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978). My delegation would like to pay a well-deserved tribute to the Secretary-General for the way in which he has shouldered his heavy responsibilities.

102. In the 38 years of the United Nations' existence we have acquired voluminous records of the sad history of South Africa's brutal occupation of Namibia and the repressive administration it has set up to maintain its illegal occupation of Namibia. It is not our intention in this debate to dwell on the history of South Africa's aggression in southern Africa. The records speak for themselves, and we do not see the need to labour the point. Even the friends and natural allies of South Africa agree with us about the sad history of events perpetrated by the racist régime. We have come here today not to recite the history of the illegal and brutal occupation of Namibia, but to examine why Council resolution 435 (1978) has not been implemented and what course of action the international community must take to fulfil the mandate of the Council.

103. It is now five years since the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia was approved by the Council in resolution 435 (1978). At that time we shared the general optimism about Namibia's independence, which we thought was just around the corner. But, to our dismay and horror, in those five years since the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), we have witnessed grave tension and instability in the region, resulting from South Africa's continued utilization of Namibia as a springboard for aggression against, and destabilization of, the neighbouring independent States.

104. As I said earlier in my statement, we have come before the Council with one objective—the implementation of the Council plan for the independence of Namibia, as called for in its resolution 435 (1978). We have agreed that the plan remains the only basis for a peaceful transition towards the independence of that country. Since the adoption of the plan, Africa and, indeed, the rest of the world have waited impatiently for the implementation of the plan.

105. We were told by those close to South Africa and by those who had offered to negotiate for it that it was ready to accept implementation of the plan. On our part, we had no illusions about South Africa's sincerity in the negotiations. Africa, together with SWAPO, has serious doubts regarding South Africa's sincerity in all these negotiations. Our fears and apprehensions were proved right last summer, when we thought the five countries of the Western contact group had prevailed on South Africa to accept the United Nations plan. Our hopes were raised with great expectations that at last the United Nations plan would be put into motion. We were not surprised at all when, soon after the so-called negotiations with South Africa, we started getting different signals from what we had been given to understand by the countries of the Western contact group. It hen became clear that, as before, South Africa was just playing its usual game of delaying tactics. Instead of implementing the Council resolution, South Africa has now made an urealistic, unrelated and unacceptable demand on an independent State, Angola.

106. It is very pertinent at this point to say that Africa welcomed the initiatives of the Western Five in their negotiations with South Africa. However, we stress that those who have assumed the responsibility of negotiating with South Africa and have received the co-operation of SWAPO should do so genuinely and stop sending confusing and conflicting signals to South Africa.

107. In his most recent report [*S/15943*], the Secretary-General, pursuant to Council resolution 532 (1983), confirmed that all the outstanding issues relevant to resolution 435 (1978) had been resolved. In the same report, he stated that he had made it clear to the Pretoria régime that the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) did not include an irrelevant and extraneous issue—namely, the linkage of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to the independence of Namibia.

108. The plan for the independence of Namibia was clearly outlined in resolution 435 (1978). The plan needs no modification or any other conditions. We therefore cannot and will not accept any notion of linking the implementation of the plan with the internal affairs of Angola. Namibians are fighting for self-determination, to liberate their own country. Angolans are fighting to preserve the territorial integrity of their own country against brutal aggression by South Africa. We must concede to the Angolans the right to seek help whenever they feel they need it.

109. The Council recently witnessed the sinister arrogance displayed by the representative of the racist régime of South Africa, who claimed that the linkage of the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the independence of Namibia had the support of the international community. That is an absurd statement. To which international community is South Africa referring? It is certainly not the international community that we know. Maybe South Africa is a member of another community not known to us.

110. Kenyans are very familiar with such threats and intimidation. In our struggle for independence we were constantly threatened in such a way by a racist minority group that tried to block our independence. In fact, when we won our independence some members of the racist group ran to South Africa. Such threats will never stop the people of Namibia from struggling for their independence.

111. To the representative of the racist régime, we say the régime has no mandate at all to speak on behalf of the people of Namibia. It is not for the racist régime to determine who the friends of Namibia are. Namibians of their own free choice will determine their own friends, who cannot accept such cheap ideological propaganda as the allegation that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola is the destabilizing factor in the region.

112. We all know that the destabilizing factor in the southern region is the racist *apartheid* régime. This racist régime is the source of all political unrest in the region, and it is this régime and what it stands for that must be changed if political stability is to prevail in the region.

113. Who is constantly attacking Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana? Who is illegally occupying Namibia? Who is oppressing and repressing over 20 million Africans in South Africa? Not the Cuban troops in Angola. It is the racist régime of South Africa. We repeat: this régime is the source of most of the political unrest in the southern region.

114. The international community is faced with a serious challenge and must respond to this challenge squarely. The Council should now move to adopt a resolution rejecting South Africa's insistence on linking the independence of Namibia to irrelevant and extraneous issues that are incompatible with resolution 435 (1978) and other Council decisions on Namibia. The Council should, for the benefit of South Africa, once more reiterate that resolution 435 (1978), outlining the United Nations plan for Namibia, remains the only basis for the peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem.

115. In the same resolution, the Council should set a date on which the implementation of the United Nations plan will begin and ask South Africa to co-operate in the implementation of the plan as envisaged in resolution 435 (1978). In the event of non-co-operation by South Africa as regards the implementation of the plan, the Council should meet to consider the necessary measures to be taken against South Africa. At that stage, clearly, there will be no doubt on the part of any State concerning the international community's demanding the application of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against South Africa. It is quite clear that we are approaching the end of the road as far as South Africa's illegal occupation is concerned. The situation is extremely desperate, and its solution may as well be desperate.

116. Before I conclude I must say that South Africa's misbehaviour, arrogance and defiance of Council resolutions is encouraged by a certain relationship it has with certain Western countries. The South African demand for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola has the support and encouragement of some States that have been negotiating on its behalf. Despite Council resolution 418 (1977), which imposed a military embargo against South Africa, we find in reliable newspapers reports of military collaboration between South Africa and Western countries and, worse still, collaboration in the nuclear field.

117. We strongly urge those countries not to encourage South Africa in any way but to use their influence to induce South Africa to comply with the Council resolution and, secondly, to refrain from any attempt, through use of the veto, to protect South Africa in its non-compliance with the decisions and resolutions of this body.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

NOTES

[1] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1971*, p. 16.

[2] Arnold J. Toynbee, *War and Civilization* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1950), preface, pp. xi and xii.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. viii.

[4] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23*, chap. VIII, sect. B, para. 17.

[5] *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF. 120/13), part three.

[6] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 22*, para. 252.

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2484th MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 24 October 1983, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2484)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   (*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
   (*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
   (*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

The meeting was called to order at 4.05 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
(*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
(*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
(*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representative of Senegal to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sarré (Senegal) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Bouguerra (Vice-President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite Mr. Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2481st and 2483rd meetings, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Kenya, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Wolde (Ethiopia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico), Mr. Dos Santos (Mozambique), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mrs. Coronel de Rodriguez (Venezuela), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Lusaka (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The first speaker is the representative of Botswana, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

6. Mr. LEGWAILA (Botswana): Sir, I should like to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the

presidency of the Council for the month of October. We are confident that, under your enlightened leadership, the Council's deliberations on the question of Namibia will not be fruitless. Your predecessor also, in no small measure, deserves our congratulations and gratitude for the skilful manner in which he acquitted himself as President of the Council last month.

7. The Secretary-General has faithfully and diligently discharged his mandate pursuant to Council resolution 532 (1983). He has, as enjoined, been in consultation with all the parties directly concerned, and, as evidenced by his report [*S/15943*], all the parties are agreed and have confirmed that all outstanding issues pertinent to Council resolution 435 (1978) and its implementation have been resolved. We have been assured that South Africa will in due course—at any rate, before the Security Council convenes to adopt the enabling resolution—announce its choice of electoral system. Even the nagging issue of United Nations impartiality is said to have been given the quietus it has so richly deserved for so long.

8. In other words, five long and frustrating years since the adoption of Council resolution 435 (1978), we are at long last able to pride ourselves on having achieved what not long ago could be regarded only as an impossible dream: the creation of a workable plan for peaceful change in Namibia. Never before have we been so close to finding a peaceful, lasting solution to the problem of Namibia. A plan designed to realize such a solution is in place and we have a golden opportunity to implement it without delay.

9. And yet, sadly, we are gathered here not to effect the implementation of the plan, but to debate the reasons why it should be implemented. We are gathered here, as we were four months ago, to debate an artificial impasse created by those who, for reasons best known to themselves, have sought to hold the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia hostage to the resolution of issues which have been judged to be totally extraneous to the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination.

10. Let us face facts. The Secretary-General's report carries a message which can be described only as extremely ominous. The report makes it clear, particularly in paragraph 25, that to South Africa the linkage is a permanent reality which cannot be ignored out of existence—or can be ignored only with risk to Council resolution 435 (1978). The representative of South Africa confirmed this in his statement to the Council. He stated, with all the arrogance of the power at his country's disposal, that "the Government of South Africa is irrevocably committed" to linkage [*2481st meeting, para. 149*].

11. So we must ask where we go from here, particularly since neither the front-line States nor the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) are prepared to allow themselves to be drawn into the negotiation of an issue they not only hate but regard as totally irrelevant. Having listened to South Africa's statement, does the Council need any other reason to be persuaded to accept the fact that the United Nations plan for Namibia, which it adopted with so much hope and promise five years ago, is facing a very serious crisis? Does the Council need to be persuaded to face the fact that, by its insistence on linkage, South Africa is virtually decreeing that the birth of Namibia's independence will be a Caesarean one rather than one brought about by the peaceful implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978)? Yes, it is the very existence and/or survival of the United Nations plan for Namibia which is at stake. The plan's survival and implementation are incompatible with insistence on the linkage.

12. We have steadfastly rejected every argument that has been advanced in support of the linking of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. No amount of cold-war slogans and fabrication of facts pertaining to the situation as we see it in southern Africa will convince us that there is any organic relationship between the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and the presence of foreign troops in another country.

13. We have also rejected, not without contempt, the theory or view that the independence of Namibia must of necessity be predicated on the existence in advance in southern Africa generally of a political and security climate specifically tailored to give comfort and confidence to South Africa, while leaving the rest of the countries of the region destabilized into submission. We cannot accept the insinuation that the onus is on the majority-ruled countries of southern Africa to demonstrate their peaceful intentions towards South Africa. We reject the suggestion that it is incumbent upon South Africa's neighbours to make southern Africa safe and secure for South Africa if South Africa is to be expected to co-operate in the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978). The onus is on South Africa first to abandon the violent politics of racism inside South Africa itself and create in that country conditions in which conflict will find no fertile ground on which to grow and flourish. The onus rests squarely on South Africa to demonstrate to the countries of southern Africa that it seeks nothing but peaceful relations with them.

14. We dare not forget that we are talking here about a country whose troops have been ensconced, uninvited and unwanted, in the southern part of Angola since 1981, about a country which now insists that its victim, Angola, must, in addition to being occupied, also allow itself to be stripped naked and exposed to the vagaries of Pretoria's politics of intimidation. It is Angola which has every right to seek redress from this Council, because it is Angola which, since the very eve of its birth as a free and independent country, has never ceased to be the playground of South African troops.

15. Yet we are told that before we can be allowed to implement Security Council resolution 435 (1978) an agreement on "the fundamental requirements of Cuban withdrawal" [*ibid.*] will have to be reached. Nothing is said about the fundamental requirements of withdrawal of South African troops from the territory of Angola.

16. In any case, how long are we expected to continue the permissiveness with which we have in the past five years treated South Africa's addiction to negotiation by

blackmail and brinkmanship? The linkage must stand rejected, not only because we see the issue as part of a not-so-sophisticated plot hatched by South Africa and its friends to reshape the political landscape of our region in their own image, but principally because to accept that the issue can be part of the United Nations plan, which it cannot, would be tantamount to extending an open-ended invitation to South Africa to introduce more linkages and enjoy the unearned liberty to dictate callously, with impunity, peace terms to the rest of the African subcontinent.

17. Right from 25 April 1978, when Prime Minister Vorster declared South Africa's acceptance of the plan, Pretoria's track record shows unmistakably a persistent penchant for bad faith. How else can we explain acceptance of the plan by South Africa in April 1978 and the brutal massacre of hundreds of innocent Namibian refugees at Cassinga the next month, in May, followed in June by a proclamation setting the stage for the holding of provocative, nonsensical internal elections, followed from then on by endless frivolous arguments about the size of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), monitoring of SWAPO forces in Angola and Zambia, followed by persistent casting of aspersions on the integrity of the United Nations and its chief executive on the question of impartiality, and insistence on the adoption of constitutional principles in contravention of the plan? And now we are told that in further supplication for South Africa's co-operation we should acquiesce in the linking of Namibia's future to the fate of Cuban forces in Angola. Where will it end?

18. The Council is called upon to reject the intrusion of the linkage issue into the United Nations plan for Namibia, for the issue poses a provocative challenge to the authority of the Council. As the Secretary-General says, "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)" [*S/15943, para. 24*]. And we agree. The plan is ready for implementation. It has been ready since 1982.

19. The attempt to hold the future of Namibia hostage to South Africa's continuous excuses, somersaults, contortions, fabrications and distortions of reality must, we have reason to expect, also confront our colleagues in the Western contact group with a very frightening, if not sobering, moment of truth. Throughout the five long years of the existence of the United Nations plan—which originated as the Western plan—we have never ceased to remind the Western nations that within their grasp lies a golden opportunity to play a meaningful, constructive role in the decolonization of Namibia. Today, I must submit, we cannot but expect them to watch in horror as this golden opportunity disappears into the sunset.

20. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Kuwait. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

21. Mr. ABULHASSAN (Kuwait) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The delegation of Kuwait is pleased and proud, Sir, to see you presiding over the Council this month, for in that high post you do honour to sisterly Jordan and to the entire Arab world. We are confident that, with your well-known wisdom and ability, you will guide the Council this month to the success for which we all hope.

22. I should like also to express our thanks and appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair, for the wisdom with which he conducted the work of the Council last month.

23. At first sight, it might seem to any observer that it has not been a long time since the last meetings of the Council to consider the question of Namibia, after which the Council adopted its resolution 532 (1983). But, as far as we are concerned, this is not a question of time—whether long or short—but rather one of a problem that, unsolved for too long, has become exacerbated, with all the negative developments which that entails. The delay has also opened the way for the introduction of new, extraneous and irrelevant elements into the question. These elements stem from the escalating conflict between the two super-Powers and from the state of relations between them, which is approaching that of the cold-war years

24. But we believe that the question of Namibia is a question of the illegal occupation of a Territory for whose administration the United Nations is responsible. That occupation by South Africa is a breach of international law, of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations and a glaring act of defiance of the international will.

25. The question of Namibia is and remains also a question of the racist régime's insistence on pursuing a policy of repression and terrorism against the indigenous population, against the true owners of the land and of the power. It is, furthermore, a question of aggression carried out against neighbouring African States, which poses a threat to international peace and security.

26. It is on that basis and on that basis alone that this issue must be considered, and it is in the context of those premises that all efforts must be focused. It must be recognized that this respected Council and the great majority of the States of the world agree on the same diagnosis. But it is a source of disappointment—nay, of grave concern—that, despite the clarity of its vision, the Council has been unable to take practical steps towards the implementation of its resolutions. That is because certain quarters, which are able to bring effective influence to bear on the Council's ability to act, are insisting on the inclusion of elements that are extraneous to the essence of the problem and insisting on discussion of these elements as a pre-condition for the resolution of the problem of Namibia.

27. The Secretary-General's diagnosis of the situation we are facing is correct and was set out clearly in his report prepared pursuant to Council resolution 532 (1983) and after his visits to the parties concerned. In that report the Secretary-General stated that "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*ibid., para. 25.*] Elsewhere in his report the Secretary-General added that he

had repeatedly made it clear that he did not accept the so-called linkage.

28. Kuwait believes that the time has come to face this reality and to concentrate on it, because it is neither just nor fair to impose a new extraneous element that stems from the escalating struggle between the super-Powers on this issue. We believe that the illegal linkage advocated by the United States, which is being used by the Government of South Africa as a pretext for it to continue its occupation of Namibia and to go on bleeding it of its wealth, is actually aimed at serving American strategic interests in the long term.

29. The United States must realize that forcing this new element into its strategic equations runs counter to the responsibilities it has assumed together with other Western States to resolve the problem in accordance with Council resolution 435 (1978).

30. The price of that strategy is great indeed. It is being paid by the Namibian people because they are being subjected to racist policies of oppression and inhuman measures of repression. They are deprived of the most fundamental human rights. All this is taking place because of the competition between the super-Powers for zones of influence, as though the destinies of peoples, in the opinion of those States, were not worth a grain of salt.

31. My delegation believes that linking Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola is in contravention with the letter and spirit of Council resolution 435 (1978). In our opinion, such linkage is an intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, a State that has of its own free will decided how to defend its territorial integrity against South Africa's repeated attacks. It is therefore necessary at this critical juncture in the Namibian question to emphasize strongly again the total responsibility of the United Nations as regards Namibian independence.

32. Since the Council has a moral responsibility to implement its resolutions, and since the Council is the main organ responsible for maintaining international peace and security, it must carry out its commitments; it must take the necessary measures within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. We believe that Pretoria's racist régime will not grant independence and justice to the Namibian people and will not respect international legitimacy unless it is forced to do so by the international will, the source of legitimate rights. Only the imposition of strong sanctions against the régime will force it to do so.

33. Kuwait believes that, at its present meetings, the Council should take a step forward in implementing its previous resolutions by setting a reasonable time-frame for the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978) and ensuring that forces are joined to ensure its respect. In this we are encouraged by the Secretary-General, who in his report stated that:

> "However, no one is more aware than I that we cannot claim real progress until an actual date is fixed for the start of implementation of resolution 435 (1978), and the cease-fire comes into force. I have no doubt that further disastrous consequences will result if we do not reach this stage quickly." [*ibid., para. 28.*]

34. Kuwait avails itself of this opportunity to renew its full support for SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, in its legitimate and just struggle to achieve independence. Kuwait supports the front-line States in their stand *vis-à-vis* the problem. Kuwait condemns all acts of aggression against them by the Pretoria racist régime.

35. Kuwait calls upon the Council to confront the challenges to its efforts to defend the principles and achieve the objectives set by the international community.

36. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Sri Lanka. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

37. Mr. FONSECA (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, at the outset let me thank you and through you the other members of the Council for affording me this opportunity of addressing the Council on the question of Namibia. Sri Lanka extends its sincere congratulations and good wishes to you, Sir, on your assuming the presidency of the Council, and its thanks to Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana for his guidance of the Council in September.

38. We are meeting at the bidding of the African Group of States and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. It is good to remind ourselves therefore that this debate, then, is not a casual occasion. It was not the intention of the sponsors of this debate that it be conducted for debate's sake or prolonged unnecessarily. I shall therefore be brief.

39. The visit of the Secretary-General to southern Africa in response to resolution 532 (1983) was a major event and an opportunity for the United Nations to ascertain through the person of its highest executive the true situation regarding the question of Namibia. We are most grateful for the Secretary-General's excellent report [*S/15943*]. Even the representative of the Government of South Africa was constrained to concede that the report represented the correct position regarding the state of progress towards Namibian independence. If the report is in its final analysis rather pessimistic, it has the virtue also of being realistic and will therefore enable us in the present debate not only to take stock accurately of the situation but also to identify, without illusions, what precisely is hindering movement towards Namibian independence.

40. Council resolution 435 (1978) was an unusual show of unity on a major issue. It promised much because all the permanent members of the Council acquiesced in the independence plan it outlined. SWAPO, the national liberation movement of Namibia, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the non-aligned countries—indeed, the entire international community—accepted, at least for a time,

the bona fides of the Government of South Africa when it declared its agreement to implement the plan. The many false starts, the feints and the deliberate procrastination to which the independence plan has been subjected are only too well known to us; they have been described in this debate as well.

41. The Secretary-General reported that his prolonged and intensive consultations have resulted, so far as UNTAG is concerned, in resolving "virtually all the outstanding issues". He came to the conclusion that, in fact, "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)" [*ibid., para. 24*]. Suprisingly enough, the representative of South Africa said just as much at the 2481st meeting. What is, then, obstructing Namibian independence is clearly something totally out of the context of, if not irrelevant to, resolution 435 (1978), upon which the entire international community, including South Africa, predicated Namibian independence.

42. South Africa talks of securing the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition to be fulfilled before it gives the independence plan a real chance to work. The South African representative told us on 20 October that "the South African Government's position on the question of Cuban withdrawal is acknowledged and has support within the international community" [*S/PV.2481, para. 149*]. Perhaps we are entitled to ask whom South Africa has in mind when it speaks of having support within the international community. Cuban troops were present in Angola well before the adoption of resolution 435 (1978). The question of these troops did not figure in negotiations leading to the resolution. It is difficult not to question the South African Government's bona fides when time and again we find that whenever the Namibian question is on the verge of solution the South African Government invariably finds a fresh excuse to defer its co-operation.

43. South Africa has also cast doubt on the impartiality of the United Nations and its capability of supervising Namibia's march towards independence. Now we find that South Africa's complaint is confined to this: that certain United Nations bodies are biased in favour of SWAPO. It has been South Africa that has reneged on all its promises. The United Nations can do no more than create conditions under which an act of self-determination can be exercised as a pre-condition for independence. The imputation that the United Nations is biased is an insult to all its Members as well as to its Secretariat of independent international civil servants. The United Nations truly cannot tilt in favour of South Africa—for it appears to be this that South Africa wants.

44. The Council's message to South Africa should be clear and unequivocal: that a linkage cannot now be made between the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and implementation of resolution 435 (1978). That resolution is self-sufficient and the provisions in it are all that is required for the exercise of the right of self-determination for the Namibian people, the creation of appropriate conditions for such an exercise, the logistics for elections, and the eventual independence of the Namibian people.

45. If I keep my assurance to the Council that this statement would be brief, that does not imply any less a commitment on the part of Sri Lanka to the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO. I should like to reiterate Sri Lanka's solidarity with the struggle of the Namibian people for the establishment of a free, unified and independent Namibia. We appeal to those States that are of greater consequence than we to prevail upon South Africa to heed not merely the voice of the international community but also the voice of reason by permitting the full implementation of resolution 435 (1978) without delay and without the imposition of extraneous pre-conditions and obstacles.

46. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America): May I begin this our first intervention this month by congratulating you, Sir, on your accession to the presidency, and by expressing my Government's confidence in your judgement, integrity and objectivity—all of which we know have already been and will continue to be evident in your conduct of the Council's business. I would also express our approval and gratitude—already abundantly expressed here—to the representatives of Guyana for their most expeditious and excellent conduct of the Council's affairs last month.

47. The tragic events in Beirut yesterday testify to the dangerous point to which international issues can grow if left to fester unresolved. Unfortunately, the people of southern Africa are no strangers to such unhappy—indeed, tragic—scenes. It is our special responsibility as members of this august body to confront the problems of our world in a timely, realistic and responsible manner. This is not easy, for many factors work against anyone who assumes seriously the task of peacemaker.

48. Certainly the members of the Council and the leaders of the front-line States, as well as those of the contact group, have expended great effort in the search for a way to bring Namibia to a peaceful independence. We have come very close to our goal, but we have not yet succeeded. Meanwhile our frustrations mount, and the call for violent solutions grows louder. In times like these I believe that a special value attaches to clear assessment, to the skills of diplomacy and statesmanship, of our political leaders. It is our responsibility to help the people of the world to see better where we are and how far we have come so that they will renew their commitment to the goal of a prompt and peaceful settlement of this terribly troubled and important issue, and not from despair cast aside the agreements already so painfully reached.

49. It is for these reasons that the United States especially welcomes this opportunity for the Council once again to exercise its responsibility for Namibia and to review developments in the negotiations being conducted pursuant to Council resolution 435 (1978) since the Council's last discussion in May. On that occasion, the Council was able to hear directly from the principal parties to the

negotiations regarding the progress that had been achieved and to address frankly what remains to be done in order to bring about implementation of the United Nations settlement plan. On that basis the Council was able to act unanimously through the adoption of Council resolution 532 (1983) to ask that the Secretary-General lend his personal good offices to consultations with the parties aimed at identifying a basis for the movement toward Namibia's rightful independence. My Government welcomed the Secretary-General's sincere, constructive and skilful approach to his mandate under resolution 532 (1983). I should like once again to express the deep appreciation of the United States for the dedication and objectivity shown by the Secretary-General and his staff, which have so thoroughly characterized their commitment to the Namibia settlement process and which have in fact—and very significantly—gained the confidence of all sides to that conflict.

50. The Secretary-General's achievements have been noteworthy. My Government welcomes his interest and his continued involvement in our efforts to reach our common goal. In his report to the Security Council [*S/15943*], the Secretary-General described in detail his discussions in South Africa, Namibia and Angola, underscoring both the very significant achievements of his trip and the obstacle that still stands in the way of a settlement. The United States attaches the highest importance to the results of the Secretary-General's discussions with the South African Government. In the course of those talks very real progress was made on issues that had until then remained unresolved over the years. Notably, all questions regarding UNTAG that had a direct bearing on the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) have now, as we understand it, been cleared up. The South African Government has also affirmed its commitment to indicate at an early date, prior to implementation, its choice of an electoral system. We regard this as important forward progress. The South African Government has also stated unequivocally that it now has no question or reservations regarding the impartiality of the United Nations in the settlement process. These are significant accomplishments which have contributed in important ways to building a climate conducive to a peaceful settlement of the Namibia conflict.

51. Similarly, my Government welcomes the Secretary-General's report that SWAPO President Nujoma, in his meeting with the Secretary-General in Luanda, reaffirmed that his organization was ready to sign a cease-fire and to move forward on implementation on the basis of the agreements that have been reached [*ibid., para. 21*].

52. Although the Secretary-General's initiative in southern Africa measurably advanced the negotiations, his report to the Council also made clear that there does remain one issue standing in the way of implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978): South Africa's position regarding the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This put into focus the frustration widespread in Africa, felt most sharply among the front-line States that have worked so hard and so long on the Namibia process. That an issue outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978) is delaying our common objective is obviously a matter of frustration. The United States and its partners in the contact group share that frustration. However, my Government remains firmly convinced that this obstacle can and should be resolved, that this can be done with perseverance and good will, that we will be able to overcome this obstacle. The United States remains firmly committed to the objective of Namibian independence pursuant to resolution 435 (1978). Our attachment to freedom, manifested in our foreign and domestic policies since our own independence struggle more than two centuries ago, permits no other course. Our continuing concern in these negotiations has been that this goal be approached realistically, practically. We must recognize that, as a practical matter, implementation of resolution 435 (1978) will take place only if the fundamental concerns of all parties are addressed. To that end, we have devoted our energy to the search for a solution based on reciprocity, with full mutual respect for security and sovereignty on all sides, with Namibia's independence as its only acceptable result. We will remain engaged in this effort as long as it appears that there is a chance for a peaceful solution.

53. The problem of cross-border violence in southern Africa is of deep concern to us all. We are working toward a peaceful resolution of the region's differences and have urged and will continue to urge military restraint. We do not believe there are military solutions to the conflicts afflicting the States of this troubled region. Our policies are premised on the belief that negotiated solutions are both possible and essential. As we have said in the past, cross-border violence cannot be condoned, whether it be in the form of a bomb placed in a crowded square in Pretoria by externally-based organizations or in the form of the continuing violation of the territorial integrity of Angola by South Africa's forces.

54. Many speakers in this debate have stated their concern over the amount of time it has taken to move the negotiations as far as they have come. The truth is that the complex issues directly relating to the United Nations plan have required the most delicate negotiation. With the results of the Secretary-General's trip there is today virtually complete agreement on the basis for implementation of resolution 435 (1978). It is also equally clear that there can be no final resolution of the Namibia question without the co-operation of the parties most directly involved.

55. During the May debate, the position of my Government regarding these negotiations was made clear to the Council. There has been progress since then. As the Secretary-General's report makes clear, at the same time our basic position has not changed, and I will restate that position today.

56. The United States neither seeks nor desires any special advantage or position for itself in the negotiations. It is not our intention, nor is it within our power, to impose our views or wishes on the parties whose interests and aspirations are most directly involved. We fully respect the fact that the political decisions needed to proceed with implementation of the United Nations plan are sovereign decisions that can be taken only by the Governments most immediately and directly concerned. We further recognize

that those who must take those decisions will wish to assure themselves that their own interests and security will be respected and protected. Our sole objective has been to assist the parties in overcoming the difficulties that have to date prevented the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and the attainment of Namibia's long-deserved independence.

57. While Namibian independence is not yet within our grasp, it is within our sight, doubling our impatience but also redoubling our commitment. The United States is convinced that the will for a settlement is present on all sides, in no small part based on recognition of the imminent dangerous alternative of an escalating cycle of destructive violence. The future of the people of Namibia, for which the United Nations and the Council bear unique responsibility, depends on our working together to keep the negotiating process firmly on track. The United States continues to stand ready to work closely with other members of the Council and with other parties to hasten the day when an independent Namibia can take its place among us as a sovereign State. Until that day, it is to each of us to think how best we can contribute to that achievement.

58. The PRESIDENT (*Interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Zambia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

59. Mr. LUSAKA (Zambia): Sir, when I addressed the Council at the 2481st meeting, I conveyed to you the congratulations of the United Nations Council for Namibia on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I now have the pleasure of conveying to you the congratulations of the Zambian delegation. We are pleased to see you presiding over the Council because you represent a country, Jordan, which is a staunch supporter of the cause of the people of Namibia.

60. May I also, on behalf of the Zambian delegation, pay a tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, who presided over the work of the Council last month with distinction.

61. My delegation is grateful to the Security Council for allowing us to participate in this important meeting on Namibia. We do so subsequent to important statements made by eminent African and other non-aligned spokesmen. Those who preceded me, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and the Secretary for Foreign Relations of SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, have ably articulated the issue at hand and indicated what the international community in general and the people of Namibia in particular seek in this debate. I do not intend to repeat in detail the ground already covered by them.

62. The point of departure in this debate is the report of the Secretary-General [*ibid.*], which he submitted to the Council pursuant to paragraph 5 of its resolution 532 (1983). That Council resolution was yet another attempt to accelerate the independence of Namibia through the implementation of the United Nations plan under resolution 435 (1978).

63. The international community's concern for the delay in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) was very strongly stressed at the Council meetings last May, which resulted in the adoption of resolution 532 (1983). The mandate given to the Secretary-General by the Council in its resolution 532 (1983) was in response to that international concern.

64. We note from the Secretary-General's report on his visit to South Africa, Namibia and Angola that all outstanding issues relevant to Council resolution 435 (1978) have virtually been resolved. That statement by the Secretary-General was confirmed by the representative of South Africa in his statement of 20 October 1983 before the Council. In his statement, the representative of South Africa clearly stated that his Government had agreed to hold discussions with the Secretary-General in order to attempt to resolve "the remaining outstanding issues to be addressed in the context of resolution 435 (1978), namely, the choice of the electoral system and some problems relating to the composition of UNTAG." [*2481st meeting, para. 146.*] Referring to the report of the Secretary-General, the representative of South Africa confirmed that those two issues had now been resolved as far as South Africa was concerned. He added that certain outstanding matters regarding the agreement on the status of UNTAG had also been resolved. [*ibid., para. 147.*]

65. It is significant that the representative of South Africa made it clear in his statement that the remaining outstanding issues, in his words, "in the context of resolution 435 (1978)", had been the choice of the electoral system and some problems relating to the composition of UNTAG. Equally significant and welcome was the confirmation by South Africa that these issues had now been resolved.

66. The South African representative also said that his Government remained firmly committed to seeking a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia on the basis of Council resolution 435 (1978) "within the framework of the understandings reached with the United States and the Western contact group". He added that it was in furtherance of that commitment that his Government had agreed to hold discussions with the Secretary-General. [*ibid., para. 146.*]

67. We do not know what the "understandings" referred to by the South African representative are. Whatever they are, if they are outside the framework of resolution 435 (1978), they certainly cannot commit the United Nations. In any event, it is gratifying that the Secretary-General's visit to South Africa resulted in resolving those matters within the framework of resolution 435 (1978) relevant to the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. That indeed is our interest. We are concerned with and must deal only with matters that are within the scope of resolution 435 (1978) leading to the attainment by the Namibian people of their long-delayed independence.

68. Given the progress recorded in the report of the Secretary-General and confirmed by South Africa in the statement of its representative in the Council in relation to the outstanding issues remaining for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), it stands to reason that we should now prepare for the launching of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia.

69. Prior to the commencement of the plan, however, it is only logical that South Africa should be asked to indicate, without delay, its choice of the electoral system to be used in Namibia. The position of SWAPO on the question of the electoral system is well known. It has shown great flexibility in this regard, all in the interest of the speedy implementation of the United Nations plan.

70. On the other hand, the South African position on this matter has remained a secret. As it is necessary that the electoral system should be known before the Council adopts an enabling resolution for the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia, South Africa's hitherto secret choice should now be revealed. It is only fair that all the Namibian people, and indeed the United Nations, should be informed of South Africa's preferred choice of electoral system. South Africa should no longer keep the international community guessing as to what its intentions are on this matter. The secret must be unveiled without any further delay.

71. This brings me to the disturbing question of the linkage being insisted upon by South Africa between Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. While South Africa states, on the one hand, that issues "in the context" of resolution 435 (1978) have been resolved, it insists, on the other, "that it will not be possible to put into practice any settlement plan unless a clear agreement is reached on Cuban withdrawal". South Africa tells us that it is "irrevocably committed on this issue" and that its position on the question of Cuban withdrawal "is acknowledged and has support within the international community" [*ibid., para. 149.*]

72. This position of South Africa is self-contradictory. It is a graphic demonstration of the mentality of the South African régime. As my Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Goma, stressed in his statement in the general debate at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the claimed linkage being insisted upon by South Africa is unquestionably illegal, irrational, irrelevant and diversionary.[1]

73. It stands to reason, therefore, that Zambia finds the South African position totally unacceptable. Moreover, the claim that the position of South Africa enjoys support within the international community is ridiculous. It is well known that the overwhelming majority of the world's countries and peoples have rejected the linkage issue with the contempt it deserves. Only one country is known to share publicly this position of linkage with the racist régime of South Africa. It would appear that the South African régime has a distorted conception of the term "international community", which it evidently defines within the confines of its relations with the United States Administration.

74. The continued stress on linkage between Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in fact raises serious questions concerning South Africa's sincerity in its purported commitment to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Linkage may well turn out to be a treacherous negation by South Africa of its professed commitment to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

75. Zambia maintains that the insistence on the non-issue of linkage, or parallelism, constitutes blatant interference in the internal affairs of Angola. It is highly ironic that this linkage, which was not envisaged in resolution 435 (1978), should now be introduced in order to stall further progress towards Namibia's independence. As is well known, the linkage issue was not the brain-child of South Africa; rather a member of the Western contact group, which initiated the plan for the independence of Namibia under resolution 435 (1978), contrived the linkage issue, the effect of which has been to prevent the implementation of that plan, thus delaying the independence of Namibia. By actively colluding with South Africa on the linkage issue, a member of the contact group has worked to prevent the implementation of the United Nations plan it had helped to initiate.

76. The position of the United States on the linkage issue is disturbing, to say the least. It is most unfortunate that a super-Power should seek to inject its own strategic and ideological preoccupations into a purely decolonization matter. The independence of Namibia must not be held hostage to super-Power geopolitical concerns. The question of Namibia must be dealt with purely in the context of decolonization. It should not be confused with irrelevant and extraneous issues which have absolutely nothing to do with the Namibian people.

77. Zambia calls upon the Council to reject categorically the non-issue of linkage, as it is incompatible with resolution 435 (1978). We hope that, for their own credibility and, indeed, in the interest of justice and fair play, the members of the contact group on Namibia will have the courage of their convictions, re-examine their position on this matter and identify themselves fully with such a Council position.

78. The representative of South Africa in his statement had the audacity—nay, the arrogance and impudence—to declare: "Therefore, it would be futile for the Security Council to attempt to set any deadlines or time-frames for implementation until the matter of the Cuban presence in Angola has been resolved, and it should be understood that South Africa would not accept any such deadlines." [*ibid., para. 156.*]

79. What could be futile about setting a deadline or a time-frame for the implementation of the plan in view of the fact that South Africa has conceded that the remaining relevant issues have been resolved? Is it not the next logical

step for the Council to take? Does South Africa really expect the Council to embrace the extraneous issue of linkage, sit back and wait for the resolution of a matter over which it has no jurisdiction? That, in the view of my delegation, would constitute failure by the Council to live up to its responsibilities. Under no circumstances must the international community acquiesce in the designs of South Africa to place responsibility for the non-implementation of the United Nations plan on Angola. That responsibility lies squarely on the shoulders of the Pretoria régime and its supporters, and it must remain so.

80. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate Zambia's condemnation of the racist régime of South Africa for the perpetration of a dastardly act of aggression against Mozambique on 17 October 1983. Repeated South African acts of aggression against and destabilization of front-line and other independent African States in the region clearly demonstrate the threat to international peace and security that the *apartheid* system represents. The aggressive posture and designs of the Pretoria régime cannot and will not be concealed by its often-repeated protestations against the so-called spread of communism in southern Africa.

81. The crimes of the *apartheid* régime against the oppressed people and sovereign and independent African States in the region only strengthen the resolve of our peoples to eradicate, once and for all, the scourge of *apartheid* and racist minority rule. South Africa's alarmist rhetoric about the spread of the communist bogey will deceive no one. The problems of our region do not stem from communism. The absence of peace and security in southern Africa is a direct consequence of the policies and practices of *apartheid* of the South African régime.

82. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of the German Democratic Republic, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

83. Mr. OTT (German Democratic Republic): The delegation of the German Democratic Republic would like at the outset, Sir, to express its congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of October. Your great diplomatic skills will no doubt contribute to discharging the responsible tasks facing the Council.

84. Our thanks go also to your predecessor, the President of the Council for the month of September, the representative of Guyana.

85. Once again the Council has to deal with the question of Namibia. We are confronted with the fact that no progress has yet been made in finding a solution to this issue. My delegation has closely followed the important debate held so far. The statement at the 2481st meeting by the representative of SWAPO, Mr. Peter Mueshihange, clearly demonstrated the disastrous consequences for the Namibian people of the fact that they are denied independence and the right to self-determination. At the same time, the dangers to the stability of the situation in southern Africa as well as to world peace and international security have beeen very impressively pointed out to the Council.

86. The underlying reasons for this extremely dangerous situation are well known. They are the policy of aggression and terror pursued by the *apartheid* régime in South Africa, and at the same time the ever more overtly practised complicity of certain imperialist countries, above all the United States, with the *apartheid* régime. In shrewdly schemed co-ordination, all kinds of efforts are made to deny the Namibian people, struggling courageously under the leadership of SWAPO, their legitimate rights. The transparency of the manoeuvres to this end is revealed time and again. The main feature is distinct delaying tactics, accompanied by a deceptive, purposive optimism.

87. As early as 1976, the Council, in its resolution 385 (1976), had proposed a programme for the solution of the question of Namibia. Resolution 435 (1978), which was adopted two years later, was praised by Western States as a "success" of the self-appointed contact group. However, the moment concrete steps towards the implementation of the resolution had to be taken, one member of the group, in conspiracy with South Africa, raised artificial obstacles. Suddenly, insurmountable difficulties seemed to come up as regards the election system and the composition of UNTAG, and the competence of the United Nations was called into question. The solution to the question of Namibia was made dependent on issues having nothing to do with the matters laid down in resolution 435 (1978). The unjustified linkage was almost unanimously rejected during the general debate of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

88. There is no lack of attempts by the closest partners of Pretoria to block the implementation of decisive measures to be taken by the United Nations against the terror régime in South Africa and even to divest the Organization of its responsibility for finding a solution to the Namibia issue and confront it with a *fait accompli*. This fully accords with South Africa's efforts to achieve so-called internal settlements. Five years ago there was the holding of pseudo-elections. They were declared null and void in Council resolution 439 (1978). Today, when the "Turnhalle Alliance" has come to a shameful end, the Administrator-General plans to set up a Council of State, whose only function would be to maintain the currently prevailing conditions of exploitation and South Africa's hegemony over Namibia. The German Democratic Republic strongly condemns such attempts to undermine the United Nations plan for a solution to the question of Namibia.

89. All manoeuvres undertaken by the United States and other Western countries to delay the granting of independence to Namibia are determined by their wide interests in southern Africa. What matters to them is the preservation, and possible strengthening, of the *apartheid* régime as a bastion of imperialist policy in that region, as well as the continued exploitation of the human and natural resources of Namibia. This constitutes an open affront to world public opinion, and at the same time does harm to the reputation of the Council, as the respective States act arbitrarily against resolutions adopted by the United Nations.

90. Such an approach, together with the unworthy attempts to whitewash the crimes of *apartheid*, simply encourages Pretoria to continue, and even escalate, its aggressive policy towards neighbouring States. Regrettably, there is ample proof of that: the continued occupation of Namibia and large parts of the territory of Angola; the increasing number of acts of aggression against that country, as well as against Mozambique and Lesotho; and the expanding economic sabotage of other front-line States.

91. The people and Government of the German Democratic Republic vigorously condemn Pretoria's most recent barbaric attack, against Maputo, the capital of Mozambique.

92. The diplomatic collusion of imperialist States with South Africa is accompanied by overt political, economic and military complicity. Let me recall the fifty-million-dollar deal that was concluded only a few weeks ago between United States corporations and Pretoria with the express approval of the United States Administration. That deal enables the racists in South Africa to step up further their plans to acquire nuclear weapons. We also notice with great concern that, as can be seen from documents provided by SWAPO, the puppets retained by Pretoria will be directly financed under the cover of so-called Western European development aid to Namibia.

93. Considering all the problems in connection with the whole issue, the question must be put of how the right of Namibia to independence can be exercised. We hold the view that, in its relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), the Council has provided a clear programme to that end. It is imperative that the United Nations—and particularly the Council—meets its full responsibility for the solution of the question of Namibia and for the implementation, in letter and in spirit, of the resolutions, adopted.

94. In addition to this, the immediate termination of all collaboration with Pretoria, the strengthening and strict observance of the arms embargo, and the imposition of effective sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations would constitute decisive steps towards the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia. It is, furthermore, important to provide extensive assistance to SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, in its courageous struggle.

95. Furthermore, in the documents adopted at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983 and at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April 1983, it was stated that it is not the few imperialist countries that will bring about a solution to the Namibian problem, but the joint action of the Members of the United Nations.

96. In the communiqué of the meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held recently at Sofia, the participating States reaffirmed their solidarity with the peoples struggling for freedom, independence and the right to choose freely the path their development should take, in conditions of peace and without outside interference.[2]

97. That is a substantial aspect of socialist foreign policy. In the future, the German Democratic Republic will continue as in the past to side with the Namibian people and to provide political and material assistance to their liberation organization, SWAPO. The German Democratic Republic will, furthermore, continue to support all United Nations activities aimed at granting independence to Namibia and the right of self-determination to its people.

98. **The PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Tunisia who wishes to make a statement in his capacity as Chairman for the month of October of the Group of Arab States. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

99. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. President, I should like first of all to thank you and the other members of the Council for allowing me to make a statement in my capacity as representative of Tunisia and as Chairman for the month of October of the Group of Arab States.

100. The fact that the Council's consideration of the question of Namibia—that is, of the fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of a people to independence and freedom—is taking place under your presidency, Sir, is both reassuring and comforting to us. You are one of us: the representative of a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, of a fraternal Arab country which also finds itself on the front lines, faced by a colonial situation and supporting a struggle for right and justice. No one could understand better than you the struggle of the Namibian people or could better lead the Council to put a final end to the aims of the occupier, the designs of the oppressor and the arrogance of the aggressor. Your personal qualities as an experienced diplomat well-versed in international affairs, as well as your reputation in the Council, reassure us as to the outcome of the present deliberations.

101. Allow me also to convey to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, our warmest gratitude for the exemplary way in which he conducted the Council deliberations during the particularly busy month of September.

102. In referring to the question of Namibia before the General Assembly on 28 September last, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia stated the following:

> "On the African continent there still persists an anachronistic problem which threatens ultimately to become the most resounding failure of this Organization, of the principles it advocates and indeed of international legality itself. This is the question of Namibia, which is still under the yoke of illegal occupation and the worst type of colonialism.

"After so many concessions by the Namibian people and its sole representative, the South West Africa People's Organization, after proofs of impartiality and balance by the United Nations, no pretext or subterfuge—certainly not one which would make of the sacred struggle of the Namibian people an East-West issue—is any longer acceptable. We expect of those who bear special responsibility for the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), and who so far have not been able to keep the promises they have made us, explanations and indications of their intentions."[3]

103. It is in this spirit that we have come to the Council today. It is not our intention to plead an unknown cause, because the cause of the Namibian people and their battle for dignity and freedom has reached everywhere and become known to everyone. We seize this opportunity to ask their sole representative, SWAPO, to convey to the Namibian people once again our admiration and our solidarity.

104. In his remarkable report, the Secretary-General, whose objectivity, clear-sightedness and courage deserve our praise, brought up an important point when he said that "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*S/15943, para. 25.*] In the very same report the Secretary-General adds that he will not accept linkage of the two questions. That is clear and unambiguous.

105. Thus we find ourselves faced with a new obstacle deliberately placed in the way of the persistent efforts undertaken to implement resolution 435 (1978). What so far has been the reaction to this new challenge of "linkage"?

106. At the nineteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, held at Addis Ababa in June 1983, Africa condemned that concept. The non-aligned countries denounced that concept at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government, held at New Delhi in March 1983. At its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly rejected the concept. One of the members of the contact group and a permanent member of the Security Council, France, has categorically rejected it. We expect the other members of the contact group to put an end to the ambiguity that has been maintained on this extraneous element with regard to the settlement plan that they themselves initiated. We expect those who within the contact group have made the freedom of peoples a profession of faith to match words with deeds, and principles with realities. Freedom is indivisible and can never be selective.

107. The present deliberations of the Council present an opportunity for decisive clarification of the responsibilities of each party.

108. For our part, we wish to restate here our total rejection of this form of bargaining whereby an attempt is made to establish a link between the legitimate accession of Namibia to independence and the implementation of the no less legitimate right of independent and sovereign States to choose their allies.

109. In this respect, it is important to note that this artificial concept of linkage has cropped up after other equally artificial pretexts have been used long enough to delay settlement of the Namibian problem. This stems from the now well-known delaying techniques used and recognized in southern Africa, as also in the Middle East, which, under the pretext of some strategic role, enable the occupier and the aggressor to act with ever-increasing impunity and to side-step or neutralize any criticism that may appear in the West.

110. In passing from hand to hand the well-known recipes that guarantee the connivance if not the blessing of their allies, the Tel Aviv and Pretoria régimes every day increase their oppression of the Palestinian and Namibian peoples under the pretext of fighting against what they call the terrorists, meaning the Palestine Liberation Organization and SWAPO. They try and outdo each other in their aggressions against the peoples of southern Africa and the Middle East, striking in Angola and Mozambique at one time, in Lebanon and Iraq at another. Using the pretext of security, they occupy parts of the territories of sovereign States Members of the United Nations, as, for example, Angola, Syria and Lebanon. Yet again, within independent countries, they carry out manoeuvres aimed at destabilization by fanning antagonisms and handing out arms to their rival factions. Both régimes have used the same combat, the same strategy, the same techniques and the same language of force under the fallacious pretext that their security has been threatened.

111. This is a curious concept of security invoked by the very ones who in their respective regions seek and boast of military supremacy, who receive from their allies massive amounts of armaments and who even receive assistance in the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons. This eccentric notion gives rise to the question: Why is this concept of security not to be applied to the other countries which maintain a peaceful attitude in both regions?

112. The report of the Secretary-General, which is now before the Council, among other things draws our attention to the critical economic and social situation of the Namibian people. One must therefore ask oneself if this is one of the reasons behind the delay of Namibian independence. But where are Namibia's natural resources? While it is known that Namibia is the world's fourth largest producer of uranium and the sixth largest producer of diamonds, that its land holds immense reserves of petroleum, lead, copper, zinc and silver, and that it has an agricultural surplus, we also know that the gap between the gross domestic product and the national income in Namibia stems, *inter alia*, from the outgoing capital in the form of profits. This is the most apparent indication of the extent the pillage of this Territory has reached, despite Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia.[4] Can one not then say that the delay in granting

independence to Namibia is due to the existence of uranium and to the considerable profits to be made by multinational and South African companies?

113. How many violations have we seen committed? How many violations of principles and of law? How many violations of the rights, resources and territories of human beings? How long will we go on tolerating this situation? How long will it take for the Council—the guarantor of peace and security and the guarantor, according to its own resolutions, of Namibia's independence—to shoulder its responsibilities and adopt the necessary measures?

114. After the failure, in January 1981, of the Geneva pre-implementation meeting, caused by South Africa's fallacious pretext about partiality by the United Nations, angry Africa turned to the Security Council in April 1981 and called for sanctions and reparation. At that time, the Council demonstrated particular partiality by using the veto under the pretext that Africa and the non-aligned were seeking confrontation.

115. In May 1983, at the request of both the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and the OAU, recourse was again had to the Council, with the fullest possible sense of measure and moderation and with the hope of being heard. It is true that the Council adopted resolution 532 (1983). But what has South Africa's reaction been to that show of moderation? The Secretary-General's report clearly shows us that there has been no change whatsoever in South Africa's attitude.

116. Today we come back to the Council, with the Secretary-General's report in hand. That report says, among other things, that "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." [*ibid., para. 24.*]

117. What will the Security Council's attitude be this time? Will it make the necessary effort to bring South Africa to the negotiating table? What will be the attitude of the various members of the contact group? Will some continue to support the untenable? Or will they bring to bear the required pressure that we expect from them—if necessary, resorting to the only method of taking away from South Africa the means by which it pursues its policy of defiance and arrogance, meaning the imposition of sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations?

118. In reaffirming once again our endorsement of resolution 435 (1978) and in calling again for its implementation without any further delay, we expect the Council to reject categorically any artificial element that is extraneous to this resolution and to set a clear and final time-limit for South Africa to begin co-operating sincerely in the application of the independence plan for Namibia. Once that time-limit had run out, the Council would automatically have recourse to the sanctions provided for in the Charter.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

NOTES

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 12th meeting, para. 112.

[2] See A/C.1/38/6, p. 7.

[3] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 10th meeting, paras. 221 and 222.

[4] *Ibid., Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24*, vol. I, annex II.

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THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2485th MEETING: 25 OCTOBER 1983

NEW YORK

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2485th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 25 October 1983, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2485)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   (*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
   (*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
   (*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

The meeting was called to order at 11.50 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
(*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
(*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
(*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representative of Senegal to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kamara (Senegal) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite Mr. Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with decisions taken at the 2481st to 2484th meetings, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Kenya, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Wolde (Ethiopia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico), Mr. Dos Santos (Mozambique), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Martini Urdaneta (Venezuela), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Kunda (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Czechoslovakia, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in

accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kulawiec (Czechoslovakia) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 24 October from the representatives of Togo, Zaire and Zimbabwe [*S/16064*], which reads as follows:

> "We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation, under the provisions of rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to Mr. Johnstone F. Makatini, representative of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), to participate in the Council's consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia'."

7. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to this request.

It was so decided.

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The first speaker is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

9. Mr. TREIKI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I wish at the outset, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. My delegation is all the more happy about this because you are the representative of a fraternal country that is linked to mine by bonds of brotherhood and of consanguinity as part of the greater Arab nation. I am confident that your experience, skill, ability and expertise will enable you to guide the Council's work to achieve the best possible results, despite the difficulty of the circumstances that we face.

10. I cannot fail to express my delegation's appreciation to our friend Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana for brilliantly guiding the Council's work last month.

11. The Council is once more seized of the question of Namibia, which it has met to consider scores of times and which the General Assembly has debated at all its regular sessions since the first, held in 1946, and at two special sessions and an emergency special session devoted to the question. Hundreds of resolutions on the subject have been adopted in international forums, and all the details of the matter are clear. Therefore, I shall not go into the details, but shall confine myself to certain observations on the situation in Namibia and the reasons for the obstruction of its independence so far.

12. Almost 17 years have elapsed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) on 27 October 1966, which ended South Africa's Mandate over Namibia. The Security Council, in its resolution 264 (1969), recognized the termination of the Mandate and appealed to the Pretoria régime to withdraw immediately its administration from the Territory. However, the racist régime disregarded the General Assembly resolution and that of the Security Council and continued its defiance of the will of the international community.

13. More than five years ago, the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978), which approved the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. The majority of the countries of the world believed that all would go well for the speedy independence of Namibia because the United Nations plan was formulated by the Western contact group, which was made up of five major States, all having strong friendly relations with the racist régime in South Africa. It was thought, therefore, that they could bring pressure to bear on the régime in South Africa to comply with the will of the international community. However, the experience of the last five years has frustrated the international community. Today we are still watching the Namibian people languishing under imperialism and suffering from the policy of *apartheid*. Their right to self-determination has been denied.

14. The majority of the countries of the world have realized that the prevarication and delaying tactics pursued by the racist régime in South Africa are designed to prolong its period of occupation in Namibia and to impose a puppet government on its people. However, certain Western countries have always obstructed any attempt by the Council to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to compel the racist régime to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations and to withdraw from Namibia. I am sure that all of us still remember the results of the meeting of the Council held in April 1981, at which three countries members of the Western contact group resorted to the use of the veto in the vote on the draft resolutions before the Council concerning Namibia.

15. It has been evident that the Western contact group is not serious in its commitment to help the United Nations reach a solution to the question of Namibia. So far the members of the group have not exercised any significant pressure on South Africa. It is clear that their interest in maintaining the flow of enormous profits through their companies in Namibia far outweighs their interest in the independence of Namibia. They still encouraged their companies to invest in Namibia and South Africa despite the numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations that call for boycotting the racist régime. In Namibia at present there are 190 companies that are subsidiaries of companies based in countries of the Western contact group. The racist régime receives financial support from Western financial institutions and banks or from those in which the Western countries have some influence. Loans granted to the racist régime in the period from the beginning of 1979 to the middle of 1982 amount to approximately $2,756 million, which covers the annual military expenditures for South Africa and Namibia.

16. In the military field, despite the long period that has elapsed since the adoption of Council resolution 418 (1977) imposing an arms embargo against South Africa, that embargo has not been strictly implemented and the racist régime has been able to receive enormous quantities of arms as a result of the collusion of the Zionist entity and certain Western countries. The racist régime, as a result of the help given by those countries, or some of them, in the field of military technology has been able to develop its military industries and has become almost self-sufficient in producing most of the major military *materiél*. Hence, it has been able to increase its military strength, to continue its occupation of Namibia and to intensify its barbaric acts of aggression against neighbouring countries, violate their sovereignty and destabilize their structures, either through the use of regular forces or through the use of special mercenary bands established for that purpose.

17. Reliable reports indicate that South Africa maintains more than 100,000 soldiers in Namibia who are stationed in more than 40 military bases. The report of the United Nations Council for Namibia on the military situation in and relating to Namibia[1] states that an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 mercenaries, most of them from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Chile and Israel, are fighting side by side with the forces of South Africa in the campaign aimed at crushing the liberation struggle of the people of Namibia.

18. The racist régime in South Africa persists in its occupation of Namibia because it receives absolute support from certain Western countries that consider it to be an ally in watching over their interests in southern Africa, and also because it obtains support from another racist régime, namely, the Zionist entity in occupied Palestine. The similarity between the two régimes and their identical aggressive natures is crystal clear. The racist régime in South Africa denies the black majority its fundamental rights and in Namibia it denies the Namibian people their right to self-determination and independence. The racist Zionist régime denies the Palestinian people their right to self-determination and to the establishment of their own independent State. The racist régime in southern Africa occupies Namibia and parts of the territory of Angola, and the Zionist racist entity occupies Palestine and the territories of other neighbouring Arab countries. The racist régime in South Africa has linked its withdrawal from Namibia to the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola, whose presence is legitimate and is the sole concern of the Governments of Cuba and Angola. Similarly, the racist Zionist entity links its withdrawal from Lebanon to the withdrawal of the Arab forces that are there legitimately and whose presence is the sole concern of the Lebanese Government and the Arab parties concerned. As we see in South Africa, the bands of Savimbi are used to striking against the unity of Angola, while the racist Zionist entity is using the bands of Saad Haddad to divide Lebanon. We also see the two régimes committing repeated acts of aggression against the neighbouring countries on the pretext of pursuing the members of the liberation movements, whom they fallaciously call terrorists.

19. As the Secretary-General stated in his report:

> "In fact, we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementating resolution 435 (1978).
>
> "However, the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*S/15943, paras. 24 and 25.*]

20. The attempt to link the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola is nothing but a delaying manoeuvre by South Africa in collaboration with the United States Administration to postpone the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, to deplete the riches of the region to the fullest and to give more time to the racist régime to establish puppet elements to which it could hand over the rule of the Territory. That manoeuvre has been condemned several times in international forums as being extraneous to Council resolution 435 (1978).

21. The Cuban troops arrived in Angola at the request of the legitimate Government of Angola in order to ward off aggression and invasion by South Africa after Angola acceded to independence. The Cuban troops would not have remained so long in Angola if it had not been for the repeated racist acts of aggression against Angola and Pretoria's continuous violations of Angola's sovereignty, its continued occupation of a part of Angola and its use of bands of UNITA (*National Union for the Total Independence of Angola*) to undermine the unity of the country in a desperate attempt to topple the legitimate Government of Angola.

22. To any impartial observer of the events, Pretoria's real intentions in insisting that the independence of Namibia be linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops are well known. Its malicious intentions are crystal clear. If the conditions the Pretorial régime has set—conditions that the international community regards as illogical and unacceptable—are not met, Pretoria will have thus created an excuse for its continued occupation of Namibia and its obstruction of Namibia's independence. And if the international community acquiesces in those conditions, Pretoria stands to gain in this way too: the path would be open for its troops to march on the capital of Angola and topple the régime there.

23. If those were not the racist régime's intentions, its demands would make absolutely no sense, because if South Africa withdrew from Namibia it would be hundreds of miles away from the Angolan border and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola would not be a source of annoyance or a threat to its security in any way.

24. The question of Namibia's independence is clear: the international community is faced with a blatant challenge by the racist Pretoria régime. It is now high time that the Council fulfilled the pledge it made about five years ago in

resolution 439 (1978), in which it warned the Pretoria régime that its failure to co-operate in the implementation of Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) would compel the Council to "meet forthwith to initiate appropriate actions under the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VII therefore, so as to ensure South Africa's compliance with the aforementioned resolutions".

25. The situation in Namibia is deteriorating every day. There are daily acts of oppression, persecution, detention and assassination of the black people in Namibia by the racist régime. That régime is intensifying its invidious manoeuvres within Namibia, in a desperate attempt to side-step the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people. It is increasingly pursuing the members of SWAPO and attempting by all means to establish a puppet Government in the Territory.

26. The situation in southern Africa poses a grave threat to international peace and security. One of the reasons for that threat is the deteriorating situation in Namibia. The international community must redouble its efforts to guarantee Namibia's speedy independence, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, and particularly Council resolution 435 (1978). My country maintains that Namibia's independence can be achieved only on the following bases.

27. First, all States must give their complete and unconditional support to the Secretary-General in the praiseworthy efforts he is making to ensure implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. Secondly, it must be reaffirmed that the two main parties to the conflict are SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, which is struggling for the Territory's independence, and the racist Pretoria régime, which is illegally occupying the Territory. Thirdly, there must be support for the armed struggle waged by SWAPO, in order to increase the pressure on the racist régime to induce it to comply with the will of the international community and withdraw from Namibia. Fourthly, a specific timetable must be set for the strict and speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978), without any amendments and in such a way as to guarantee Namibia's full independence and the sovereignty of the Namibian people, led by SWAPO, over all their territory, including Walvis Bay and the offshore islands. Fifthly, mandatory sanctions must be imposed in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter to compel the racist régime to withdraw its administration from Namibia, thereby strengthening the prestige of the United Nations.

28. My delegation sincerely hopes that the Council's efforts will be crowned with success and that the Namibian people will be enabled to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.

29. My delegation wishes to warn the Council against the manoeuvres to which South Africa and its allies resort under the slogan of "peaceful solution". The real aim is to side-step SWAPO and impose a tendentious solution the final result of which would be a dependent, puppet Government guarding the interests of the imperialist States.

30. Finally, I wish to express my country's unconditional support for the Namibian people in their just struggle, led by SWAPO, for self-determination and independence. We shall continue to give all forms of moral and material support to those heroic people and to the people of South Africa until they achieve independence and racism in southern Africa has been totally eliminated. We wish also to reaffirm our solidarity with the front-line States, which are the victims of repeated aggression by the racist régime. We condemn these acts of aggression. We also condemn South Africa for its continued occupation of Namibia and a part of Angola's territory.

31. The five States of the contact group bear considerable responsibility in regard to Namibia's independence. The States that we see sending troops here and there to occupy islands, topple régimes and crush peoples, would have been better advised to send their troops to implement Chapter VII of the Charter and to work for Namibia's independence.

32. At the very moment when we are debating an important question—the decolonization of Namibia—in the Council, we see a State being invaded for the purpose of colonizing it once again. The Council must affirm its presence and its effectiveness as an instrument for the achievement of peace and security and the maintenance of the independence of peoples.

33. In conclusion, I wish to pay a tribute to Mr. Paul Lusaka of Zambia and to the Secretary-General for the efforts they are making to ensure speedy independence for Namibia.

34. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Venezuela. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

35. Mr. MARTINI URDANETA (Venezuela) (*interpretation from Spanish*): On behalf of the Venezuelan delegation, allow me, Mr. President, to tell you how pleased we are to see you presiding over the Council this month, during this important series of meetings. Your excellent diplomatic record is a guarantee that you will be able to guide the Council towards the fulfilment of its desired goals.

36. My delegation wishes also to express its most sincere congratulations to Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana on the way in which he directed the Council's work in September.

37. The Venezuelan delegation thanks you, Mr. President, and all the other members of the Council for giving us this opportunity to participate in this debate, which is of exceptional importance.

38. The Council is meeting once again to consider the situation in Namibia. The United Nations is committed to the cause of Namibia's independence, not only by virtue of

General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, but also by the plan—known as the United Nations plan—approved in Council resolution 435 (1978).

39. From 23 May to 1 June this year the Council met to resume its consideration of the situation in Namibia. During those meetings [*2439th to 2444th and 2446th to 2451st*], the participation of ministers for foreign affairs of a large number of countries confirmed the importance and urgency of seeking a solution that would enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and independence promptly.

40. On 31 May, the Council adopted resolution 532 (1983), in which it called upon South Africa to heed and comply with resolution 435 (1978) and to co-operate forthwith with the Secretary-General to expedite the implementation of that resolution, since it was the only valid basis for a negotiated solution to the question of Namibia.

41. In compliance with paragraph 4 of resolution 532 (1983), the Secretary-General held consultations with the parties involved in the question of Namibia. He has set forth the results of those consultations in the report he has submitted to the Council [*S/15943*].

42. The Venezuelan delegation wishes to take this opportunity to congratulate the Secretary-General on his efforts undertaken in compliance with resolution 435 (1978), 439 (1978) and 532 (1983) and to state the following.

43. First, we are pleased that, as affirmed by the Secretary-General, it has been possible to resolve some outstanding problems such as the selection of an electoral system and the question of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and its composition, progress that brings us closer to a final solution as to the modalities for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

44. Secondly, we are extremely concerned at South Africa's attempt to continue to set pre-conditions for the effective and rapid implementation of resolution 435 (1978), adducing the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, a matter that could "only be dealt with in its own context by those directly concerned acting within their sovereign rights", as the Secretary-General made clear in his report. We reject such attempts by the Pretoria authorities and consider them inadmissible in the context of resolution 435 (1978).

45. Thirdly, we regret that it has been impossible to obtain a cease-fire commitment in spite of the stated willingness of SWAPO to sign a cease-fire agreement with South Africa, an indispensable requirement for the holding of elections in Namibia, with a view to establishing the Constituent Assembly, in an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity. One the contrary, South Africa's acts of aggression against neighbouring countries have multiplied in recent months, contributing to mounting destabilization of the democratic régime of the region and creating an extremely serious situation that calls into question the alleged good intentions of the racist Pretoria régime.

46. Lastly, we wish to say that we share the optimism of the Secretary-General when he affirms that "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)" [*ibid., para. 24*]. At the same time, we reiterate our firm and resolute intent to contribute to the independence of Namibia and to co-operate with the people of Namibia through SWAPO, their authentic and legitimate representative, in every way possible in the struggle for independence and freedom and the establishment of a democratic State, respectful of human rights, whose presence and influence are needed not only by the African continent but by the entire international community.

47. Therefore, we condemn the linkage thesis advanced by the South African régime, which is attempting to make Namibian independence dependent upon irrelevant issues extraneous to resolution 435 (1978). We urge the members of the Council to lend their support so that 1984 may be the year of the independence of Namibia, thus crowning with success this prolonged effort by the entire international community.

48. Mr. de La BARRE de NANTEUIL (France) (*interpretation from French*): Five months ago, in its resolution 532 (1983), the Security Council unanimously decided to mandate the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire with a view to securing the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

49. At the outset I should like to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General, who has courageously carried out a difficult mission. My delegation notes three points in particular in his report [*S/15943*].

50. First, we note the confirmation of the good will and the spirit of compromise manifested by SWAPO, in particular Mr. Sam Nujoma's reaffirmation that his organization was, in principle, prepared to accept either proportional representation or the single-member-constituency system for the elections.

51. I welcome the responsible attitude of the SWAPO leaders. Notwithstanding the repeated frustrations during endless negotiations and the intensification of the fighting, they have maintained a moderate policy throughout.

52. Secondly, we note with satisfaction the resolution, during the Secretary-General's stay in Cape Town, of the last of the problems still pending in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978); I refer to the composition and status of UNTAG and the question of impartiality.

53. It is in the name of that impartiality that my delegation wishes today to give credit to the Pretoria Government for the gestures they made last August, which, though belated, are positive none the less. The progress made is described clearly and precisely in the Secretary-General's report, and it has led to significant results.

Agreement is now being reached on all the modalities for the implementation of the United Nations plan for a settlement in Namibia.

54. That means that South Africa cannot now reopen the subject. Everything has been completely settled as regards the conditions for implementation of resolution 435 (1978). It now only remains for South Africa to notify the Secretary-General's Special Representative of the choice of electoral system. In the opinion of the French delegation it would be desirable, if only for practical reasons, that the announcement be made as soon as possible.

55. My last and most important comment on the report is that the Secretary-General has only been able to obtain a reaffirmation from Pretoria, without any concessions, of the unacceptable link between settlement of the Namibian question and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. On 20 October, at the 2481st meeting, we heard the South African representative reiterate in intransigent terms the views of his Government on this matter.

56. France's position on the question of a linkage is well known here. It was defined most clearly by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Claude Cheysson, at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April last.[2]

57. Our position has not changed in the interim, nor will it change. It can be expressed succinctly: neither Namibia's accession to independence, nor the implementation of Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) can be impeded by external considerations. Those resolutions stand on their own merits. They must be fully implemented as they were adopted, without conditions or prerequisites. France unswervingly upholds this position within the contact group.

58. Virtually the whole of the international community now condemns the so-called linkage. The question that now arises, it seems to me, is whether we are to conclude from South Africa's continued insistence on linkage that the time for negotiation is past and that there no longer exists any hope for a peaceful settlement.

59. We too asked ourselves that question when we thought of the victims of a conflict that is being endlessly protracted. I refer to an entire population, the people of Namibia, who have for so long a time, as the Secretary-General pointed out, been "suffering... denial of their legitimate aspirations for genuine self-determination and independence" [*ibid., para. 26*]. But I am also thinking of the front-line countries, and in particular of Angola, which has not known a single day of peace since its accession to independence and which has been the victim of deadly raids, large-scale destruction and even partial occupation.

60. When we think of the victims of that conflict, can we resign ourselves to the idea that negotiation no longer has any justification and that henceforth the prospects before us offer nothing but the pursuit and, doubtless, the worsening of military operations?

61. My delegation fully understands and shares the feelings of bitterness and frustration many African delegations have expressed here. At the end of last spring, a wave of optimism was felt in New York. Once again, however, hopes for a prompt settlement were disappointed.

62. Yet, as the President of the Republic, Mr. François Mitterand, stated at a press conference held in this building on 28 September, France feels that "although the game is a difficult one, it is not over" and "concessions are still possible".

63. South Africa must realize that it cannot use force to resolve its problems as it did in Maputo on 17 October, or by resorting to the language of threats as its representative did here on 20 October. Force and constraint have never been the basis for lasting settlements acceptable to all.

64. At this stage all that my country can do is to make yet another emphatic appeal to South Africa. Since that country, by its demands—which have been endorsed by others—is contributing to the deadlock in the negotiations, it should now make the gestures that will lead to an agreement and to the implementation, at long last, of the United Nations plan for a settlement in Namibia.

65. Mr. LING Qing (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): It is really a great pleasure to see you, Sir, the distinguished representative of Jordan, as President of the Council for this month. There exists a profound friendship between our two countries and peoples. Not long ago, His Majesty King Hussein paid a successful visit to China which further enhanced the relations of friendly cooperation between China and Jordan. I am convinced that with your outstanding talent and rich diplomatic experience you will successfully guide the Council in discharging its important duties for this month.

66. I also wish to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, for his contribution to the completion of the Council's heavy tasks during the month of September. We deeply admire the abilities with which he conducted his work.

67. Ministers for foreign affairs from some 20 African and non-aligned countries attended the Council meetings on Namibia last May. On 31 May, the Council adopted resolution 532 (1983), by which it decided to mandate the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire, with a view to securing the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978). In accordance with the mandate assigned to him by the Council and following consultations with the parties concerned, the Secretary-General paid a visit to South Africa, Namibia and Angola in the latter half of August and submitted a further report on the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) [*S/15943*]. We deeply appreciate the efforts made by the Secretary-General for the implementation of resolutions 435 (1978) and 532 (1983) with a view to achieving the independence of Namibia at an early date.

68. In the conclusions to his report the Secretary-General stated:

> "These prolonged and intensive consultations have resulted, as far as UNTAG is concerned, in resolving virtually all the outstanding issues. In fact, we have never been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." [*ibid., para. 24.*]

Since all the outstanding issues have been resolved, it should have been possible to implement resolution 435 (1978) right away, but that, however, is not really the case. As the Secretary-General pointed out,

> "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*Ibid., para. 25.*]

69. Five years have passed since Council resolution 435 (1978) was adopted. During that period, SWAPO and the front-line States have worked tirelessly to promote the United Nations plan. Their responsible position has been widely praised and supported by the international community. The Government of Angola and SWAPO gave the Secretary-General full co-operation during his visit to southern Africa, which demonstrates once again their sincere desire for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and the peaceful settlement of the Namibian question.

70. It is the South African racist régime which has been obstructing the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) over the past five years. In the negotiations for implementing that resolution, South African authorities have repeatedly raised side issues and created excuses of all kinds to procrastinate further in reaching agreement on relevant questions. To link the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola is the main pretext that has been used by the South African authorities for the past year or more for not implementing the resolution. It is common knowledge that there is no justification whatsoever for linking Namibia's independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, which are two issues of different nature. How can a country be denied independence because there are foreign troops in another country? This argument put forward by the South African authorities was thoroughly refuted at the Council meetings held last May, as well as at other international meetings. The unreasonable position of the South African authorities has met not only with outright rejection and stern condemnation by SWAPO and the front-line States, but also with strong opposition by the international community. Most members of the Western contact group have indicated that they do not approve of such linkage. It is regrettable, however, that there is still a permanent member of the Council that supports this unreasonable position of the South African authorities and has thus inflated their arrogance.

71. What merits our special attention is the fact that, while obstructing the United Nations plan, the South African authorities are stepping up their scheme of an "internal settlement". They have been trying for years to foster puppets. After the collapse early this year of the "Ministers Council", which was rigged by them, the South African authorities have now been hatching out a "Council of State" for "drafting the constitution".

72. The South African authorities have carried out repeated armed invasion and political subversion against Angola and other neighbouring countries, attempting by intimidation to make them stop supporting the just cause of the Namibian people. They are still occupying part of the territory of southern Angola. Their recent attack on the residences of South Africans in Maputo is another instance of violence against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mozambique and a new crime against the peoples of South Africa and Mozambique. Furthermore, they have incessantly carried out intimidation, subversion and even blockade against Lesotho, which is geographically surrounded by South Africa. Their subversive activities against the other front-line States have never ceased. Such perverse acts on the part of the South African authorities constitute the root cause of the turmoil in southern Africa.

73. The Chinese delegation strongly condemns the South African authorities for obstructing the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and resolutely opposes the unreasonable proposition of linking Namibian independence with the Cuban troops' withdrawal from Angola. We firmly support the Namibian people, who are waging a just struggle for national independence and liberation under the leadership of SWAPO. We support the just demands and correct proposals put forward by SWAPO and the African countries. The Chinese delegation is also in favour of strong measures, sanctions, against the South African authorities by the Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

74. We are convinced that no force on earth can stop Namibia from winning independence and liberation.

75. Mr. TINOCO FONSECA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish first of all, Sir, to tell you how pleased my delegation is to see you presiding over these debates of the Council. We have full confidence in your diplomatic talents and skill, and we are convinced that your leadership will continue in an effective manner to bring about the results for which we all hope.

76. We also commend Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana for the admirable work that he accomplished last month when he presided over the Council.

77. The colonialist occupation of Namibia by South Africa, the permanent and continued violation of the rights of the Namibian people , and the attempts to place the independence of that Territory within the framework of East-West confrontation have brought the Council together again at the very moment when another act of invasion has taken place, in a Caribbean nation, the offspring of Africa, an act which weakens international law and the principle of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

78. In connection with Namibia, we are now facing a new challenge and we are being given a new opportunity to show mankind that our existence responds to the needs of a modern world in turmoil.

79. The efforts of the international community to put an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia have been repeatedly ignored and, in one way or another, evaded. When the oppressor mentality of the Pretoria racists has itself been unable to create new pretexts, the United States presence rises up and offers new elements.

80. It is a widespread feeling, shared by allies and adversaries alike, that, in the final analysis, it is the United States that is responsible for South Africa's continued disregard of the resolutions of the Council, especially its resolution 435 (1978), and is therefore responsible for Namibia's continued status as a South African colony, a homeland enslaved, a victim of the most pitiless plunder and exploitation by Western transnational corporations, and a hostage to the securing and protection of the strategic interests of the United States.

81. When, in January 1981, South Africa sabotaged the Geneva talks, it impugned the impartiality of the United Nations. The real reasons for that attitude are found in the attempts to install a puppet régime in Namibia, guaranteeing the perpetuation of colonial domination, plunder, subjugation, and the protection of those inadmissible interests, to which we have already referred.

82. With the patience, flexibility and exemplary attitude of SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the heroic people of Namibia, and with the support of the United Nations, it was possible to overcome obstacles to the implementation of the plan for the independence of Namibia pursuant to resolution 435 (1978). Considerable progress was achieved and, perhaps naively, it was thought that everything was ready for the achievement by Namibia of independence. It was thought that that great undertaking, which today is once again putting the effectiveness of the Organization to the test, would quickly achieve the results hoped for by all. Perhaps we had forgotten the capacity of Pretoria and its United States allies for manipulation.

83. When agreement approaches, the United States gives South Africa yet another pretext to delay the implementation of the independence plan: the presence in Angola of Cuban troops, and their withdrawal as a *sine qua non* for the granting of independence to Namibia. Needless to say, that issue had never been considered before, and resolution 435 (1978), which had been accepted by South Africa and which the United States had voted in favour of, does not include such considerations.

84. During the recent general debate in the General Assembly, the most eminent representatives of the international community rejected the attempts to make the independence of Namibia dependent on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from an attacked, but independent and sovereign, Angola.

85. An outstanding son of Africa, a brilliant politician and statesman, and a standard-bearer of non-alignment, Mr. Julius K. Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, said with admirable clarity when he referred to this issue that:

> "We know that South Africa has adopted this policy in the last two years on the encouragement of a permanent member of the Security Council. We know that South Africa is remaining stubborn with the encouragement of that State ... Angola is an independent sovereign State which has suffered from external aggression from the moment of its birth. It has a right to decide for itself on its defence needs. The attempt to link the independence of Namibia with Angola's sovereign decisions has to be rejected by the whole of the United Nations."[3]

86. With brazen cynicism, the United States and South Africa have dared to demand the withdrawal of troops that are helping Angola to defend itself against aggression launched by South Africa against that country from Namibian territory. South Africa invades, attacks and attempts to destabilize Angola; it maintains and supports operations by counter-revolutionary forces, for whom it had planned to reserve a portion of Namibia in an iniquitous partition plan which South Africa had in mind a few months ago. We recall that since 1981 parts of southern Angola have been occupied by South African troops.

87. It was the same Pretoria racists that, two years ago, launched the infamous Operation Protea against the Angolan people. On 23 August 1981, the South African expansionists launched an invasion against that sister country [*see S/14646*], which involved more than 11,000 troops and an impressive amount of war *matériel* appropriate to its work of annihilation, including tanks, aircraft, helicopters and so on. Aggression is still a constant. Nevertheless, Pretoria and Washington demand the withdrawal of the troops that are helping Angola to confront that aggression. It is not difficult to imagine the true purpose of such demands. They form part of the imperialist policy of asking independent countries that are attacked to give up their right of self-defence. Angola and Nicaragua are two eloquent cases in point.

88. My country, aware of the pain caused by aggression, supports the people and Government of Angola in their struggle and recognizes their right to obtain the means necessary for the defence of their sovereignty and independence. Consistent with that position of principle, Commander Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Co-ordinator of the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction of the Republic of Nicaragua, in his statement to the General Assembly on 27 September stated:

> "The racist régime of Pretoria, with the approval and encouragement of the United States Government and other Governments which paradoxically claim to be concerned for human rights, attacks and invades Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Seychelles, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland in an attempt to consolidate and perpetuate *apartheid* and racism. Nicaragua condemns the racist South African régime and

voices its solidarity with the front-line States in their decision to support the total liberation of southern Africa.

"By the same token, we support the struggle of the people of Namibia and their legitimate representative, the South West Africa People's Organization, and we demand the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), as the Organization of African Unity demanded at its most recent summit meeting."[4]

89. We agree with the view of the Secretary-General, stated in his report to the Council, to the effect that a peaceful solution of the Namibian problem is also the key to a peaceful and co-operative future for all countries of the region and that the instability and conflict generated by the failure to resolve this problem have had disastrous results for the neighbouring countries, and especially for Angola. [*See S/15943, para. 27.*] Furthermore, we associate ourselves with the Secretary-General's statement in the same report that, however, "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*Ibid., para. 25.*] We resolutely support the efforts of the Secretary-General and his attempts to help the Namibian people to attain independence.

90. The Council has fundamental responsibilities in this issue and therefore it must take immediate measures. It must reaffirm that the independence plan for Namibia in accordance with resolution 435 (1978) constitutes the only genuine basis for a solution of the problem. It must demand the immediate implementation of that resolution, categorically and definitively reject attempts by South Africa and the United States to link the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and declare that the latter comes exclusively within the sphere of sovereign decisions of the Government of Angola. The Council must dismantle the entire range of manoeuvres aimed at maintaining and perpetuating colonial domination.

91. The Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, held in New York from 4 to 7 October 1983, referred to the situation in extremely clear terms in its final communiqué [*S/16035, annex.*] It denounced the South African manoeuvres to strengthen its domination in the Territory. In particular it deplored the establishment by South Africa of the so-called Council of State in Namibia, which would draft a constitution in the Territory in violation of the resolutions of the United Nations, and it urged the member States not to acknowledge such manoeuvres. The Non-Aligned Movement on that occasion also firmly asserted its position with regard to the presence of troops in Angola by stating that the Meeting regretted the continued failure to implement the United Nations plan for Namibia contained in Council resolution 435 (1978), which represented the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia. In particular, it rejected recent attempts by certain Powers concerned to introduce into the question of Namibia elements completely extraneous to it. Attempts to establish linkage or parallelism between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, in addition to being incompatible with resolution 435 (1978), constituted interference in the internal affairs of Angola and were unacceptable.

92. Nicaragua considers that all the real pitfalls have been overcome; agreement on an electoral system and the composition and emplacement of UNTAG. In other words, everything requiring discussion within the framework of resolution 435 (1978) is now the subject of agreement. There are some minor details which should not entail major difficulties. However, Africans are very familiar with the protagonists in this issue. The *New African* in its issue of October this year predicts that, even if an agreement is reached in the Security Council, the United States can be expected to invoke the question of Cuban troops in Angola, thus frustrating the independence of Namibia; and, of course, with the United States engaged in a "constructive engagement" with South Africa, anything may be expected. This "constructive engagement" has been given concrete expression. The United States Government has just approved multi-million-dollar contracts with seven transnational corporations of the United States to provide training, servicing and spare parts for nuclear installations in South Africa, in open violation of the arms embargo decreed by the Council. Thus the United States is strengthening the nuclear capacity of its gendarme in that region, which refuses to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], and whose nuclear installations are not subject to international supervision, thereby constituting an enormous threat to African security.

93. We wish to affirm our position clearly. We demand the immediate implementation of resolution 435 (1978). We wish to express our solidarity with the struggle of the people of Namibia and their authentic and legitimate representative, SWAPO, and with the front-line States; we condemn the acts of aggression that they have suffered at the hands of the Pretoria racists, the most recent having been perpetrated against the ANC offices at Maputo, which affects the territorial integrity and sovereignty of that sister country. We feel that, if the irrational and defiant attitude of South Africa continues, as is suggested by its arrogant statement in this body recently, the Council will have to consider the adoption of appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

NOTES

[1] See A/CONF.120/3 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 30.

[2] *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), annex II, sect. A, 3.

[3] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 14th meeting, para. 11.

[4] *Ibid.*, 7th meeting, paras. 85-86.

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